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ABSTRACT
Traceroute is a popular active probing technique used by researchers, operators, and ad-
versaries to map the structure and connectivity of IP networks. However, traceroute is
susceptible to making inaccurate inferences. We perform a large-scale longitudinal inves-
tigation of traceroute artifacts to find anomalies that may be indicative of network errors,
misconfiguration, or active deception e orts. Using the IPv4 Routed /24 Topology Dataset
from the Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA), we provide a taxonomy of
traceroute results, including anomalous and unexpected artifacts. We analyze the distribu-
tion of the observed artifacts and attempt to find attribution to the cause of each. Finally, we
provide a longitudinal analysis of multi-protocol label switching in order to explore possible
explanations for unexplained artifacts.
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The Internet is a dynamic, trillion-dollar ecosystem prevalent in every aspect of society.
However, this ecosystem does not continue to exist and function without significant e ort.
To keep the network running, network operators rely on a variety of network management
systems and techniques, as well as a suite of tools for debugging the network when problems
arise. An important aspect of network management, particularly with respect to routing
and defending against attacks, is accurately understanding the logical topology of the
network. An accurate logical topology of the network facilitates an understanding of the
interconnections between network devices.
Researchers, network operators, and policymakers rely on accurate data in the form of
network topologies. Unfortunately, the diagnostic tools available today to determine the
network topology are limited due to the lack of underlying support from the network, as
well as information hiding. An Internet service provider (ISP) may practice information
hiding for competitive or security reasons, especially across administrative boundaries. The
state-of-the-art tools currently in use for inferring network topologies are largely based on
traceroute techniques.
Therefore, it should be of concern to the community that previous research has demonstrated
techniques that can deceive and distort network topologies formed through the use of
traceroute. This is due to the fact that there is no integrity in traceroute. Furthermore,
misconfigurations and mis-implementation of networking devices can cause anomalous
returned results for a given traceroute. These results can cause incorrect inferences of the
true network topology. The prevalence and scale of these anomalous traceroute causing
networking devices requires investigation.
1.1 Importance of Network Topology
Network Topological maps are interesting and insightful diagrams. However, they may be
under-appreciated as powerful and useful tools. This section will focus on a few of the




If a destination is unreachable and there is a need to find where in the path a problem occurs,
a network operator may utilize traceroute. It can be important to determine which parts of a
service are down and in what geographic regions, a recent example being the Amazon Web
Services (AWS) outages [1]. Additionally, a problem does not need to arise for traceroute
to be used as a diagnostic tool. Many organizations simply want to know where their tra c
is flowing on the way to a particular destination. A specific scenario could be an ISP, or
some other large organization, may have agreements with many ISPs who charge varying
amounts for tra c over their domain. A large entity concerned about cost of their internet
tra c could use traceroute to identify which providers are receiving their tra c. This large
entity could then change their tra c to flow over a provider that charges less on the way
toward a particular destination. While this is just one hypothetical example, there is little
doubt that the organization would benefit from the use of a network topological map in this
scenario and many like it.
1.1.2 Network Optimization
To keep pace with ever-increasing demand, network operators and providers must optimize
their networks. A content distribution network (CDN) is one such entity that commonly
considers network topologies in order to deliver content as fast and reliably as possible.
An example of a CDN is Akamai, who distributes content for thousands of enterprises
such as Adobe, Airbnb, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), IBM, and many
others [2] [3]. Akamai must manage over 60,000 servers on 1,000 networks in 70 countries
in order to facilitate their CDN obligations [3]. Something that can make this challenging
is that a CDN must deliver content in a timely manner over an infrastructure that it does
not have control of, using protocols that are not designed with speed in mind. Akamai
even acknowledges that border gateway protocol (BGP) is ine cient, which is a concern to
their mission as a CDN. “[BGP] was never designed for performance: BGP bases its route
calculations primarily on AS hop count, knowing nothing about the topologies, latencies,
or real-time congestion of the underlying networks” [3]. This quote emphasizes that a large
CDN such as Akamai gives much attention to network optimization, a large component of
2
which network topologies play a role.
1.1.3 Protecting Critical Infrastructure
The Internet extends across the entire globe and through many countries. However, there
is still a finite amount of physical connections that connect one entity to another. Even the
United States is connected to other countries through a finite amount of network links. For
a smaller entity such as a CDN, ISP, or some other provider the links could conceivably
be at risk of severing from a motivated adversary, accident, or natural disaster. From a
defenders point of view, it would be important to identify those links, enumerate them, and
implement a contingency plan in order to mitigate risk.
1.1.4 Cyber Mission Planning
In many ways, cyber operations parallel physical world scenarios. As with any combat or
rescue mission, it would be unwise to proceed without attempting to discern details about a
territory or terrain. Likewise, a crucial component of any cyber mission is the intelligence-
gathering phase, which includes gaining knowledge of the adversary’s network. As one
researcher states, “intelligence gained from an organization’s network topology could allow
malicious actors to prioritize their mission objectives and identify especially weak or critical
points in the network” [4].
An example of researchers utilizing traceroute would be the team behind Argus, a system
for detecting IP prefix hijackings [5]. Shi et al. were able to demonstrate that a previously
theoretical cyber attack, BGP prefix hijacking, did in fact exist in the Internet [5]. Also, Shi
et al. did not just use normal traceroute data, but rather CAIDA Traceroute Data (CTD),
which is what will be used in this research. Shi et al. were able to find 40K routing anomalies
within a year period, from which 220 were determined to be prefix hijackings.
In general, “network and security researchers rely on topological maps of the logical
Internet to address problems ranging from critical infrastructure protection to policy” [6].
An accurate network topology is often crucial for all of the situations detailed above, which
traceroute can assist in creating. Researchers and policymakers would struggle to analyze a
trillion-dollar ecosystem if not for traceroute. It is di cult to study the internet because of
the “radically distributed ownership of its constituent parts, and an operational climate that
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generally disincents sharing data with researchers” [7]. An e ective method of obtaining
this valuable data is through utilizing traceroute.
1.2 Scope
This thesis will focus on traceroute artifacts observed in the CAIDA Archipelago routed IPv4
/24 topology dataset. We will analyze CTD from 2013 through 2017 for the IPv4 Internet.
Our analysis will look for traceroutes that appear suspicious based on criteria detailed in
Section 3.1. We will also be looking for traceroutes that traverse a multi-protocol label
switching (MPLS) tunnel. We then will analyze the suspicious traceroutes in detail in an
attempt to discover their root cause. We will also study the trends in the utilization of
MPLS by various autonomous system number (ASN) to explore any correlation with the
suspicious traceroutes.
Other datasets, such as iPlane, will not be studied. The artifacts observed are anticipated to
come from many di erent provider’s networks. Validation of results will be attempted by
contacting network providers for specific information about their networks. While we will
try to find outside validation, it is out of scope to completely validate all results as we simply
do not have access to all networks and are unable to compel network providers to work with
us. However, authors have had luck in this research area in the past in both validating their
results and identifying false positives [8]. We may look at other measurements in order to
confirm suspicions, but we will not be looking in depth at other historical measurements,
such as ping data. This research is focused on IPv4, therefore IPv6 is out of scope.
1.3 Summary of Findings
• Average detected MPLS tunnels traversed over all vantage point (VP)s hovers between
33% and 46%, while varying widely between VPs.
• Level 3 identified as a large autonomous system (AS) who stopped utilizing or
advertising MPLS in September of 2014 across multiple VPs.
• MPLS as a networking technology in large ISPs is still being used, but there are
alternatives that may explain the reduction in overall percentages. Additionally, there
may be security concerns incentivizing large ISPs to disregard use of RFC 4950 [9]
and instead not advertise that they are even using the technology.
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• PROXAD (Free ISP) responsible for the most suspicious traceroute results.
• Discovered a “wild,” previously undiscovered, Star Wars traceroute gag within our
suspicious traceroute.
1.4 Thesis Structure
• Chapter 1 is the introduction, where we discuss the importance of an accurate network
topology, the scope of our research and the summary of our findings.
• Chapter 2 is the background, where we review the basic concepts behind the traceroute
tool, the CTD, how the CTD is collected, the traceroute artifacts found by past
researchers, and an overview of the MPLS networking technology.
• Chapter 3 focuses on the methodology where we discuss how we will handle the
CTD in our attempt to identify the di erent types of traceroute artifacts. We also
detail what defines the di erent traceroute artifacts. We then discuss how we will go
about studying any traceroute artifacts, specifically by looking at their domain name
system (DNS) names in the historical DNS dataset and by looking at their associated
ASN. We also discuss some other information we may hope to gather such as the
geolocation of the artifact, the device it originates from, and the receptiveness to
which it responds to various probing techniques. We also discuss in this chapter how
will use common traceroute gag strings to search through the historical DNS dataset.
Additionally, we discuss our approach of creating a postgresSQL database to facilitate
rapid analysis. Finally, we discuss how we will focus on percentages of traceroutes
traversing MPLS tunnels on a per VP basis.
• Chapter 4 discusses the results and analysis of our research pertaining to anomalous
traceroutes.
• Chapter 5 discusses the results and analysis of our research pertaining to the trend in
utilization of MPLS by ASs and their possible influence on anomalous traceroutes.
• Chapter 6 finishes with our conclusion and suggestions for future work.
5




This chapter introduces the network tools traceroute and Scamper, and their use in creating
historical traceroute data. Also covered is the past work concerning traceroute artifacts and
the prevalence of the networking technology MPLS.
2.1 Traceroute
Traceroute is a widely used networking diagnostic and measurement tool developed by Van
Jacobson [10]. The general concept behind traceroute is to display the forward IP router
interface path and round-trip delays of packets while traveling across a network. Traceroute
operates by sending packets with increasing time-to-live (TTL) values. The router that
receives the packet will decrement the TTL by one and pass it along unless the TTL value
is zero. If the TTL value is zero, the router will send an ICMP Time Exceeded message
back to the source [11]. The source will then increment the TTL and proceed until the
destination replies (e.g., with an ICMP message or TCP FIN), until the sent packets are lost
a set number of times in a row (referred to as the gap limit) or a router at a given TTL does
not respond with the TTL exceeded messages, depending on implementation. If we do not
receive a reply from the destination, this indicates that the destination is unreachable, the
packets are blocked, or the destination is unresponsive. The source will continue to compile
its list of received router interface IP addresses.
It is important to note that information about the rest of the interfaces of the routers along
the path is not exposed, i.e., a traceroute exposes only a single interface of each router
along the path. Even though we may have a topology that includes these routers, we will
not have all of the available interfaces enumerated and the complete topology could remain
unknown. In addition, these many interfaces could lead naïve versions of traceroute to fall
prey to false inferences due to load-balancing.
Traceroute can use any transport-layer protocol (TCP, UDP, ICMP) for the TTL-limited
probes. UDP can often work well as a probing method due to firewalls having their own
default setting of permitting UDP probes [12]. Similarly, TCP SYNs can use a well-known
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port, such as port 80, to pass firewalls. ICMP echo requests are advantageous due to
being relatively lightweight but are often blocked. Finally, naïve versions of traceroute are
susceptible to false inferences, such as false and missing links, due to the prevalence of
load-balancing on the Internet. internet protocol (IP) was not instrumented for topology
discovery. Traceroute has these limitations because it is e ectively a hack that relies on
internet control message protocol (ICMP) error messages intended for other purposes. Paris
traceroute is an implementation that makes alterations to ICMP and UDP, which are called
ICMP-Paris and UDP-Paris, to ensure that all of the probe packets toward a given destination
follow the same load-balanced path [13].
2.2 Historical Traceroute Data
Historical network data of all kinds is extremely valuable to researchers. Using historical
network data, we observe trends or more deeply investigate events that otherwise would
have been missed if not for the ability to compare historic and current topologies, e.g., the
development of new connections between networks or changes in networks. For example,
Giotsas et al. used historical BGP streams in order to study outages [14]. Their findings
showed that they were more successful at detecting outages than the traditional organiza-
tions, who only detected 24% of the total outages. In the same vein, it is important and
useful to look at historical traceroute data. Luckie et al. utilized macroscopic traceroute
data correlated with global BGP data to discover that over their 2.5 year time period, 40%
of studied IPv6 routers experienced outages [15].
We can also perform accurate evaluations of optimizations, implementations of request for
comments (RFCs), or infrastructure changes. Often it would be expensive or impossible to
compare the before and after, but historical traceroute data gives us the ability. A specific
example is Lone et al. using historical traceroute to infer the ability to spoof on a given
network [8]. RFC 2827 (updated by RFC 3704) describes using ingress filtering (or source
address validation) to prevent users within an AS from spoofing an address in order to
possibly perform a denial of service attack [16], [17]. Lone et al. were able to leverage one
month of historical traceroute data in order to identify 703 provider ASs that lacked source
address validation [8]. Historical traceroute data also allows one to compare the current
abnormal result against what a path may typically look like. This combination of probing
and looking at historical probes can be a powerful tool. For example, Shi et al. created the
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Argus tool by leveraging historical traceroutes from The Center for Applied Internet Data
Analysis (CAIDA) combined with live BGP data in their e orts to identify potential prefix
hijackings [5].
2.3 Large-Scale Active Measurements
When performing large-scale active topology measurements, researchers face a few chal-
lenges. These measurements must be performed, as much as possible, in an unbiased and
uniform manner. Utilizing multiple VPs is a powerful method to minimize sampling biases.
In addition, the program Scamper enables researchers to use a uniform traceroute tool,
designed specifically for large-scale measurements, on any operating system.
2.3.1 Utility of Multiple Vantage Points
When conducting internet measurements from a single geographic location, the results
might not be reliably representative of the entire internet. That single geographic location
is referred to as a Vantage Point (also referred to as a monitor). A VP for the purposes
of this research is a single geographic location from which a researcher is studying the
internet, mainly by probing. Conducting the same measurements from another VP could
produce drastically di erent results. Shavitt et al. performed research on the importance of
distributing VPs when performing Internet topology measurements [18]. They discovered
that “although increasing the number of VPs can help in reducing sampling bias, it still does
not guarantee unbiased results” [18]. They went on to explain that other characteristics of
the VPs needed to be taken into account, such as which ASs the VPs are located within, to
avoid biased measurements. Barford et al. delves into the utility of network tomography, the
concept of gaining insight into the conditions and configurations in the core of the internet
by using a number of VPs [19]. Barford et al. finds that the marginal utility of multiple VPs
declines rapidly after two VP. However, they also noted that their research only pertains
to “the most basic topographical information about the network” [19]. In our research, we
find that using many VPs across di erent ASs and geolocations helps avoid sampling bias
and provides additional insights unique to a VP, as demonstrated in Section 5.2.
Therefore, using multiple VPs can help avoid bias from single locations, but is not su cient
by itself. Another example of such research includes Luckie et al. who studied deployed
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TCP implementations and their resilience to blind attacks [20]. Middleboxes could have
potentially manipulated their test packets before they reached their destination. Luckie et
al. used three vantage points to minimize the risk of an undetected middlebox in the hosting
network from impacting their measurements. This demonstrates another utility of using
multiple VPs to avoid biased results.
2.3.2 Scamper
For large-scale active measurements, using traceroute’s implementation on each operating
system is not ideal. In order to gather the data, specialized Internet-wide traceroute tools
are necessary. A heavily used program for large-scale active measurement is Scamper [21].
Scamper was created in order to allow researchers to conduct large-scale measurements
and archive the data more e ciently. This highly useful tool also enables researchers to
solicit volunteers from around the world, no matter their operating system. The problem
with traceroute on various operating systems is that they are all implemented di erently,
making it less than ideal for uniform measurements. In addition, they lack new features like
the Paris traceroute implementations [21]. Scamper also exposes ICMP extensions, thereby
letting us observe MPLS tunnels, a feature not found in all traceroute variations.
Another useful feature is Scampers ability to set a fixed packets per second (PPS) rate.
Setting PPS allows the monitoring node to generate a predictable, and limited, rate of tra c
based on the sites configuration policy. Scamper provides researchers with a tool designed
for research on any platform, with newer features and better output for archiving and analysis
purposes. The two output formats for Scamper are standard ASCII text and a binary file
format named warts. There also exists a warts to JSON conversion utility.
2.4 Data
Publicly available Internet measurement datasets, including traceroute data, are available
from CAIDA [22]. However, there exists other platforms besides CAIDA that provide
traceroute and internet measurement data.
10
2.4.1 Production Mapping Systems
One example of a large-scale mapping system that assists in constructing a topology of
the internet is “iPlane, a scalable service providing accurate predictions of Internet path
performance for emerging overlay services” [23]. iPlane utilizes PlanetLab servers at over
300 sites around the world and utilizes traceroute as its primary tool for determining Internet
topology. iPlane leverages BGP snapshots collected by RouteViews, which provides a list
of all globally routable prefixes [24]. iPlane looks within the BGP snapshot for a “.1
address that responds to either ICMP or UDP probes” [23]. iPlane then performs periodic
probing of the targets. Note that the frequency of the topology mapping using traceroute
is about once a day [23]. Traceroute only produces the network interfaces from the path
to the destination. However, a router along the way can have many network interfaces.
iPlane identifies interfaces that belong to the same router by looking for possible aliases and
narrowing them down to being likely aliases. iPlane also looks for DNS names assigned to
interfaces in pursuit of identifying their geographic location.
Another example of an Internet measurement infrastructure is the DIMES platform [25].
Dimes was launched in 2004 and relies on volunteers to install a software agent which helps
to measure the structure and evolution of the internet. The strength of the DIMES platform
is in the many thousands of installed agents, in many countries, and many ASs. DIMES is
an attempt at creating “mid-level granularity maps” [25], rather than AS level topologies
like RouteViews [24] or router level maps such as The IPv4 Routed /24 Topology Dataset
from CAIDA [26].
Finally, the RIPE Atlas platform is another measurement platform, consisting of probes and
anchors distributed around the globe. RIPE Atlas was designed to measure connectivity and
reachability of the Internet [27]. As of 2015, there were 12,800 probes and 109 anchors [27].
The RIPE Atlas platform uses the various “probes against anchors to measure region-based
connectivity and reachability [27].” Researchers and other participants are free to install
probes in their personal networks or organizational network, with permission. The data
collected by RIPE Atlas is publicly available.
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2.4.2 CAIDA Infrastructure and Available Data
CAIDA deploys and maintains an internet measurement infrastructure, the Archipelago
Measurement Infrastructure (Ark) [26]. Ark utilizes Scamper across an ever-increasing
number of VPs, with newly deployed VPs generally being deployed on a Raspberry Pi
computer [28]. The traceroute data is collected using Scamper in the warts file format. Ark
collects this data by splitting up the probing into three teams. Each team has VPs spread
out around the world and each team separately looks at the over 10 million /24 prefixes list.
The individual team will split the /24 prefixes amongst the vantage points. If a VP is faster
than another, it may be responsible for more work. This is important to note as the changing
workload of the vantage points can change the paths traversed by each vantage point for
each cycle.
In 2007, there were 20 total VPs, with 12 in team 1. At the time of this research in 2018,
there are 208 total VPs, with 71 belonging to team 1 [29]. Ark provides an extensive
amount of traceroute data from 2007 to 2016 for routed IPv4 /24 prefixes. CAIDA has over
10 million /24 prefixes in their list. Instead of probing a static list of IP addresses, Ark
randomly picks an address in each /24 prefix for each cycle. A cycle is the round of probing
done by all monitors for a given team, identified by an id number. The cycles are numbered
sequentially and the next cycle starts only after the previous one finishes.
Also, since Ark runs one cycle after another one finishes, there are times where a specific
date may not be available and may be contained within a cycle. For example, if a researcher
were looking for traces specifically on May 4th, the researcher may need to look at the cycle
that begins on May 3rd since these cycles can span multiple days. The destinations probed
are all the routed /24 networks, 10 million, in the IPv4 address space. A static list of IP
addresses is not used. Instead, the destination probed is randomly selected from each of the
routed IPv4 /24 prefixes for each cycle.
CAIDA also deploys VPs that probe two addresses within each announced IPv6 prefix that
is /48 or shorter. We restrict our analysis to IPv4 in this thesis; future work should perform
a similar longitudinal evaluation of IPv6 traceroute data.
The Ark from CAIDA was selected as our dataset to perform our research with due to its
extensive historical results, dating back to 2008, and for it being a complete platform, with
the inclusion of a historical DNS dataset.
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2.5 Artifacts
Intuitively, we might expect traceroute to work in two ways. It could work as we expect it
to function, by using the TTL field and ICMP Time Exceeded messages to progressively
build a list of returned router interface IP addresses leading toward a destination. Another
possibility is that we may expect traceroute to progress partially to the destination, but then
be blocked before the packet reaches the target destination. Also, this possibility may be due
to routers in the middle of the path not responding, while those at the end do if they can be
reached. In real-world traces, only 15 percent of random traces complete [30]. But there is
a third category that exists of traceroute artifacts with unexpected behavior. Some notable
characteristics are apparent when observing a large quantity of traceroute data. Some tracer-
oute results report the same IP address at multiple hops, indicating, for instance, a routing
loop. Also, some traceroute results display unexpected header information such as sequen-
tial values in the 16-bit identification field. In addition, it is possible that data packets could
take di erent paths than the traceroute probes. These cases could be due to a number of
possibilities such as middle boxes, unintentional misconfigurations, or intentional deception.
The packets in traceroute are not authenticated and do not have any integrity. This is both
ideal for those that do not want their networks probed by adversaries and troubling for
researchers trying to construct a valid network topology. As one researcher noted,
In the case of traceroute probing, the defender may manipulate the return tra c with
deception outcomes such as hiding legitimate nodes, seeding virtual nodes, and mas-
querading as other nodes. Critical servers and routers are common examples of
legitimate nodes that benefit from obscurity. [4]
As another researcher states, “An adversary using the traceroute program may be deceived
as to the physical topology of a computer network through the careful manipulation of tra c
leaving the network in response to the traceroute probe, thus masking the importance of
key nodes along the actual route” [30]. Traceroute is also susceptible to middleboxes and
intelligent routers giving deceptive replies. This can assist in hiding the true topology of a
network or “shunting” tra c into an enclave of VMs to give a false topology [30].
Such deceptive practices are not simply theoretical, but have been deployed in the wild on
the Internet. There are documented cases of deployed decoy hardware, such as the famous
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Star Wars Traceroute [31]. The Star Wars Traceroute was implemented by deploying and
configuring two Cisco 1841 Integrated Services Routers. The creator was able to bounce
packets between these two routers using virtual routing and forwarding (VRF), with the two
routers likely setup with a static route. Then, the DNS PTR records were set so that the IPs
in the traceroute would resolve into the iconic scrolling theme as the reverse DNS lookups
were performed. In other words, as the IP addresses were displayed for each hop of the
traceroute, the DNS name associated with the IP address was returned in order to show the
traceroute gag. The addresses of the routers were all owned by a single entity, as were the
corresponding DNS PTR records.
Alternatively to the Star Wars Traceroute approach, a user on Reddit [32] utilized iptables
and Perl extensions [4]. Another notable example is when The Pirate Bay caused traceroutes
to its web server to appear to lead to a North Korean IP address with a convincing routed path
to a naïve observer. One of the methods used to confirm this deception was by comparing
the round-trip time (RTT) of a transmission control protocol (TCP) three-way handshake to
that of the traceroute [33]. As of this writing, another example of an operational purposely
modified traceroute is the famous “bad.horse”. Performing a traceroute to a destination of
“bad.horse” provides a message that gives the lyrics to a song [34]. While these playful
games utilizing traceroute are relatively innocuous, they highlight what is possible should
a determined actor attempt to deceive an adversary.
MPLS is an example of a networking technology capable of producing unexpected traceroute
results and obscuring the true topology obtained from performing active probing. In the
2012 paper “Revealing MPLS Tunnels Obscured from Traceroute”, Donnet et al. concluded
that in 2011, at least 30% of traceroute paths traveled through MPLS tunnels [35]. This
widespread use of MPLS tunneling obscures router paths, potentially leading to inaccurate
or deceptive presentations of Internet topology.
Given that these traceroute artifacts exist, it is important to study the prevalence of these
artifacts, when they first appeared, and how long they were active. Also, it would be
important to discover what destination and sources are responsible. Without understanding
these artifacts and their impact on the network topology, how can any researcher have
confidence in the network topologies on which they are basing their work? In addition,
many assumptions and past studies have been performed with possible overconfidence in
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traceroute’s accuracy. Fortunately, we have access to CAIDA historical traceroutes. There
are many questions that can be answered by looking at this valuable archive. In addition, we
can perform our own probing when we find destinations displaying some of the suspicious
behavior.
2.6 Multi-protocol Label Switching
Since we perform extensive research into MPLS behavior and utilization within the CTD
in an attempt to explain a subset of the traceroute artifacts, we present here relevant details
of MPLS.
In conventional IP forwarding, routing decisions are made at each individual router between
a source and destination. Conventional routers use IP address prefixes to determine a
packet’s Forward Equivalency Class (FEC), which is used to make forwarding decisions.
Each router along a path reexamines the packet’s prefix to determine a new FEC. MPLS
deviates from this architecture by using fixed length labels, inserted into packets between
the layer 2 and layer 3 headers by MPLS routers. These labels determine the path packets
will take on their subsequent hops until exiting the MPLS tunnel. The MPLS header, which
contains the label, also has its own embedded time-to-live (TTL), utilized while inside a
Label Switched Path (LSP) [36].
Figure 2.1. MPLS header location. Source: [36].
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Figure 2.2. MPLS header contents. Source: [37].
MPLS routers make the FEC assignment once, when the packet enters the LSP. The FEC
is encoded in a label, which is inserted into the IP header and travels along with the packet
while in the LSP. MPLS can reduce the time required for forwarding decisions, provide
VPN services, and enable the implementation of specific routing paths and policies [36].
In order to classify the di erent MPLS tunnels, Donnet et al. separated MPLS tra c into
four methods of tunneling. The methods are based on the inclusion of TTL-propagate and
RFC 4950. In TTL-propagate, when a packet enters a Label-Switched-Path (LSP), the
MPLS TTL mirrors the IP TTL of the incoming packet. While traversing MPLS routers in
the LSP, the MPLS TTL is decremented at each hop. The IP TTL does not change while
in the LSP. When the MPLS TTL expires, the router will send an ICMP time-exceeded
reply. The IP packet of the traceroute probe has an additional TTL called the quoted TTL
or q-TTL, which represents the di erence in the IP-TTL from the MPLS-TTL. The q-TTL
increments at each successive MPLS router visited. By examining the ICMP time-expired
message, Donnet et al. inferred that reply packets with q-TTL’s greater than 1 indicates the
presence of MPLS tunneling within a traceroute [35].
The other tool used to identify MPLS tunneling is the observation of whether a Label
Switched Router (LSR) enables RFC 4950. If an LSR receives an undeliverable MPLS-
encapsulated datagram, it strips o  the label stack and typically sends an ICMP message
to the sender indicating why the datagram was not delivered to its destination. With RFC
4950 enabled, the LSR sending the TTL response can append MPLS information to the
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ICMP message using an ICMP extension [9].
Explicit tunnels implement both TTL-propagate and RFC 4950. With explicit tunnels,
traceroutes will reveal each MPLS router traversed and identify the MPLS routers inside
the Label Edge Routers (LERs), which start and end MPLS tunnels. Implicit tunnels utilize
TTL-propagate, but do not use RFC 4950. This will yield a traceroute return, which
identifies the MPLS routers in the tunnel, but does not identify them as MPLS routers.
Opaque tunnels do not implement TTL-propagate, but do implement RFC 4950. This
may result in some MPLS routers being obscured, but will return indications of the last
MPLS router in the tunnel prior to the egress LER. Finally, Invisible tunnels do not enable
TTL-propagate or RFC4950.
Donnet et al. used their measurement of explicit tunnels as their primary metric for MPLS
presence in traceroutes. They concluded that “at least 30% of traceroutes from most vantage
points reveal explicit MPLS tunnels and more than 5% of collected IP interfaces explicitly
exhibit MPLS capability” [35]. The data collection and analysis performed by Donnet et
al. forms the groundwork for our research regarding MPLS.
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Our methodology is to analyze the CAIDA IPv4 routed /24 topology dataset [26], which
we refer to as CAIDA Traceroute Data. This data comes from the Ark [38] measurement
infrastructure. Across monitors and time, we attempt to classify each trace as either
“normal” or “anomalous.” The CAIDA traceroute data we analyze is from the time period
starting in 2013 through 2017. Although Ark has hundreds of monitors (also referred to
as VPs), we focus on 21 stable monitors. These 21 monitors were functional throughout
the entire time period, whereas some of the non-included monitors may have had long
running maintenance or were added during our selected time period. These monitors
created 81,512 warts files, with the average traceroute count per file being 145,659. There
were 11,872,948,709 total traceroutes in the data we analyzed.
We then further break down the anomalous traces into one of three categories based on
available artifacts: 1) MPLS; 2) Misconfiguration; or 3) Deception. We then characterize
the traces within each of these three categories to better understand their origins. This
chapter describes our methodology for performing this classification; Figure 3.1 provides a
high-level overview.
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Figure 3.1. Workflow diagram
3.1 Types of Traceroute Artifacts
In this research, we plan to provide a taxonomy of traceroute results, including a categoriza-
tion of traceroute artifacts. We also intend to look at what fraction of these artifacts can be
attributed to misconfiguration, misimplementation, or potentially malicious behavior. The
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set of artifacts that we will consider include:
• Sequential IPv4 identification fields (IPIDs) from di erent routers along the path
• Many IP addresses on the path allocated from the same /24 network prefix
• Incorrect Destination IP addresses or false AS path [33]
We detail each of these artifacts next.
3.1.1 Sequential IPIDs
The IPID field with the IPv4 header enables fragmentation and reassembly. The IPID is
required to be unique within the maximum lifetime for all datagrams with a given source
and destination address pair [39]. Routers have two general IPID behaviors; they return a
random IPID or they return a sequential IPID. In the case of sequential IPIDs, each router
has an independent counter and each counter advances independently (depending on the rate
of control plane tra c or “velocity”) [40]. Therefore, we would expect that the sequence of
IPIDs in the ICMP TTL exceeded responses received from each router along a traceroute
path to be random. However, if the along a traceroute path the ICMP TTL exceeded IPIDs
are sequential, and are responses to di erent TTLs probes, this suggests that the same
counter is being used to respond to probes with di erent TTLs. This would imply that the
same router is responsible for the di erent TTLs. This is not a normal behavior as packets
are not supposed to loop, which provides us with an anomaly. We detect this anomaly
by looking at each hop within our CAIDA traceroute data for IPIDs that demonstrate this
behavior. We have set a threshold of 5 consecutive IPIDs with a sensitivity of 5 plus or
minus the previous hops IPID value. Both numbers are picked arbitrarily to limit our focus
to the most obvious examples of this artifact. At 5 consecutive IPIDs, our confidence is
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quite high that the artifact has occurred.
Data: A Given Traceroute
Result: True or False value
initialization;
threshold and sensitivity are set at 5;
while hops remaining do
read current;
if the di erence between IPID and the last IPID is less than the sensitivity then
if the di erence between probettl and the last probettl is less than 10 then













Algorithm 1: Finding Sequential IPID
3.1.2 Many IP Address of a Traceroute in the Same /24
In addition to sequential IPIDs we are looking for many IP addresses on a path that are within
the same /24 address space. In a typical traceroute, packets follow the forwarding path to
traverse e ciently between networks, progressively getting closer to the final destination.
Thus, it would be unusual in normal operation to observe responses from many router
interfaces within the same /24 network prefix.
For example, in our database one instance has what appears to be a normal tracer-
oute to a destination until it comes upon an IP address of 78.254.248.30, followed by
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78.254.248.134, 78.254.248.138, 78.254.248.142, and so on in the same /24 until tim-
ing out. Similar to the methodology for detecting consecutive IPIDs in a traceroute, we
look at each hop within a traceroute to determine how many IP addresses are within the
same /24, with a threshold of 4 determining if we classify it as anomalous. The thresh-
old of 4 was determined to empirically strike a good balance between false positives
and interesting results. As we will show later in the results, many of these artifacts are
associated with an MPLS tunnel and some are found to be related to traceroute gags.
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Data: A Given Traceroute
Result: True or False value
initialization;
threshold is set to 4;
while hops remaining do
read current;
last di erence set to current di erence;
if the current hop IP is equal to the last IP then
if the di erence between the last IP and current hop IP is greater than 0 then
if the last hop di erence is equal to the current hop di erence then
consecutive+=1;
else
if the last di erence is equal to the current di erence subtracted from 256
then













Algorithm 2: Finding many IP addresses in the same /24
3.1.3 Incorrect destination IP addresses
Incorrect destination IP addresses and false AS paths refer to incidents such as The Pirate
Bay (TPB) case study [33], where the destination address being advertised appeared to be
in North Korea for the purpose of evading regulations. TPB servers were proven to not be
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located in North Korea first by using TCP traceroute. In the typical traceroutes to TPB,
user datagram protocol (UDP) or traditional ICMP traceroutes were used. Will, a blogger,
used TCP traceroute to demonstrate that the response time indicated that the destination
could not possibly be in North Korea [33]. Because of the limitations in how fast packets
can travel due to the speed of light, the response times indicated that the destination was
limited to somewhere in Europe. In addition to performing a TCP traceroute, by looking
at the AS path Will was able to determine that the AS path was spoofed. The AS path
appeared to be going through Cambodia and then onwards to North Korea, which appeared
very impractical considering the main provider of North Korean internet is AS 4837 (China
Unicom). TPB actually had the real route end in Germany [33].
3.1.4 Multiprotocol Label Switching Observations
A large component of this research is dedicated to continuing the work carried out by
Donnet et al., who discovered that at least 30% of traceroute paths traveled through MPLS
tunnels. As mentioned earlier this widespread use of MPLS tunneling obscures router
paths, potentially leading to inaccurate or deception presentations of Internet topology.
With this in mind, we will be utilizing our database populated with Ark data to determine
the percentage of traces that traverse an MPLS tunnel on a per monitor (VP) basis. The
time period we will be examining ranges from 2013 until June of 2017. Further analysis
will be done regarding any changes in percentages between years. This analysis will focus
heavily on which ASNs are most responsible for increases and decreases in percentage, or
if ASNs remain relatively consistent in years that show little or no change.
3.2 Data Processing and Classification
To carry out our analysis, this research will rely heavily upon Scamper and CAIDA’s
Archipelago dataset. We will also use a Python library written to replicate the functionality
of scamper for parsing [41]. The Python library will be used to search for these artifacts
within the historical traceroute data. We search for the signatures of each artifact detailed
previously. We extract information about the trace for cases where we detect artifacts and
set them aside for later analysis. We only analyze team one, although we look at multiple
monitors within team one since the di erent vantage points used may give di erent results
and expose artifacts.
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While parsing the CAIDA traceroute data warts files, we deposit results and accompanying
traceroute data in a database created in order to query for specific commonalities. More
details about the database are given in section 3.2.1. While the database contains the
expected information necessary to perform a thorough analysis, the database also points
back to the original scamper warts files if further analysis is required beyond what was
selected for inclusion in the database. We use the ark dataset from 2013 through June of
2017.
For both the MPLS tunnels and traceroute artifacts, a count is kept of the number of
occurrences of each per Ark monitor. There is a counter for MPLS tunnels per VP in a
given cycle which can be compared with the total traceroute count of the VP for that cycle
to calculate the percentage. This count will be incremented by one for every traceroute that
has any MPLS. The traceroute count is incremented for every traceroute from the VP in
that cycle. In our database, these VPs in a given cycle are called files. The same applies to
our traceroute artifacts, which are the sequential IPID values and the similar IP addresses
in the same /24. A count is kept of each occurrence per file which can be compared with
the total trace count per file to calculate percentages. There is an independent count for
the sequential IPIDs artifact and the many IP addresses in the same /24 artifact, on a per
traceroute basis.
Also, for the MPLS tunnels, a count is kept of the total occurrences of explicit, implicit,
and opaque tunnels for each VP. This count includes multiple hops and can span di erent
tunnels within a single trace. It cannot be compared with the total trace count to calculate
percentages. We also make note of multiple MPLS tunnels within a traceroute with a binary
flag which is set if more than one is observed.
3.2.1 MPLS and Suspicious Traceroute Database
In this research, we will be handling large volumes of historical traceroute data. Searching
through the entire Ark dataset is time consuming and resource intensive. Instead of sequen-
tially running through the unstructured data with every question, it would be helpful to store
the information in an intermediate format. We will take the historical traceroute data from
the binary files, called warts files, and place it in a postgresSQL database. We anticipate
this task to take some time upfront, however we anticipate it being extremely helpful in our
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analysis later.
Once we have our artifacts gathered, we will begin looking for patterns. If we can detect a
pattern, such as an AS that displays a lot of these artifacts, we may consider doing some of
our own probing on the AS. We will want to look to see which destinations are displaying
multiple artifacts, which destinations within a shared network exhibit the same behavior,
and if multiple networks exhibit the observed behavior. We can also compare our probes
from various vantage points against those from the historical traceroute dataset to see if the
artifacts still occur. In addition, we will want to determine when artifacts began appearing,
if it ended and when, and if it is still active. We can utilize our historical traceroute data to
answer these questions.
3.3 Characterization of Discovered Anomalies
After finding our artifacts, we will use the following techniques to characterize the anoma-






3.3.1 Historical DNS information
CAIDA provides a IPv4 Routed /24 DNS Names Dataset, which is invaluable for comparing
against relevant addresses found within the CAIDA traceroute data [42]. “DNS names are
useful for obtaining additional information about routers and hosts making up the Internet
topology. For example, DNS names of routers often encode the link type (backbone vs.
access), link capacity, Point of Presence (PoP), and geographic location” [42]. While these
historical DNS records are collected soon after the topology traces are collected, it should
be noted they are not collected immediately. Also, CAIDA attempts to keep the burden on
external DNS nameservers and their own infrastructure low by not performing lookups on
previous obtained results dating back 7 days.
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We will utilize this historical DNS information in conjunction with our database by matching
IP addresses associated with hops that appear anomalous to their historical DNS host names.
3.3.2 Current DNS Availability
If we find an artifact in the historical record, it would be worth looking to see whether the
artifact is still active. We will detect if the address relating to the artifact resolves using
DNS. If there is an A record for the address of the artifact, we can use a Python script that
will use the socket Python module [43] to see if it retrieves a hostname:
Example: socket.gethostbyaddr("205.155.65.20")
Returns: www.nps.edu
An IP that does not resolve will return ’Unknown host’.
One problem with this approach is that it can take a long time to do it sequentially on
thousands, possibly millions, of IPs. Therefore, we will use the Python interface for an
asynchronous DNS resolver library, adns-python [44].
3.3.3 Grepping Historical DNS for Well-known Traceroute Gags
In addition to the Ark dataset, there is an accompanying historical DNS dataset, mentioned
earlier in section 3.3.1. By taking the suspicious IP addresses we have identified and
searching for their associated DNS names, we plan to manually identify those gags that
resemble traceroute gags from previous work. In addition, we plan to search through
the DNS dataset by using strings of previously known traceroute gags. Because these
traceroute gags are sometimes short lived, we are not guaranteed to find all previously
known traceroute gags. However, we expect to find some traceroute gags by searching
through the DNS dataset, which will allow us to perform some active probing with the
returned IP address.
We do not require any specialized software to search through this Historical DNS dataset.
The following example command will su ce for most searches.
• find . -name "*.gz" | xargs -n 1 -P 25 zgrep -H ’Star Wars’
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The string can also be replaced with an IP address in the command if desired. If that is the
case, it should be noted that a ’\s’ should be used to make the search more specific.
• find . -name "*.gz" | xargs -n 1 -P 25 zgrep -H ’\s72.30.208.85\s’
Without ’\s’, strings that contain the searched string as a substring would be returned.
3.3.4 Associated AS Number
In order to better understand the artifacts we discover, it is helpful to know which AS the
artifact’s address belongs to. As one researcher noted,“BGP allows each AS to choose
its own administrative policy in selecting routes and propagating reachability information
to others [45].” These individually administered policies are often necessary due to ASs
having complex relationships between other ASs and providers. Therefore, “such policies
imply that AS relationships are an important aspect of Internet structure [45].”
Note that accurately mapping router interface addresses to their correct owners can be
problematic; for purpose of this research we assume that the AS that advertises the interface’s
prefix is the owner.
It can be helpful to know who owns the AS in order to determine if a particular organization
is responsible for a consistent artifact or perhaps free of certain artifacts. Also, as was the
case with TPB example, looking at the AS along a path can allow a researcher to determine
that a path is unlikely, if not impossible [33].
We can determine the AS number of any address that we obtain. We utilize a script that can
take any number of IPs and determine the corresponding AS numbers by comparing against
a RIB file from routeviews [24]. This script performs longest prefix matching against the
route views RIB file, represented as a radix tree, to provide the corresponding AS number.
Building the radix tree from the RIB files can take some time. In order to facilitate fast
lookups, we preserve the radix tree data structures using the Pickle Python library [46].
Any AS that has a large percentage of the total artifacts found will be identified and examined
closely.
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3.3.5 Geolocation of the Artifact’s IP Address
Once we have identified our set of artifacts, it would be useful to know their geographic
location in order to discover any commonalities or patterns. If they are predominately from
a certain geographic region, we can narrow our research to that region. One way in which
we can do this is by looking at the AS number to make a general statement about where an
artifact is occurring.
We can also use a number of services to take an IP address and produce a corresponding
location. One service we may use is Maxmind GeoIP to determine the location by country
and city [47].
3.3.6 Artifacts Receptiveness to Di erent Probing Techniques
While all of these artifacts should be detectable in the Ark dataset, some artifacts may
require additional probing. Certain probes may be able to get through and display artifacts.
ICMP can often be blocked, while UDP and TCP are still able to get through. Further,
di erent probes may elicit di erent behavior, and di erent probes may be used to the way
in which deception is implemented. In the case of an MPLS router, we may be able to
determine that it is there if it is implementing RFC 4950 and ICMP extension is in the
header. In addition, di erent probing techniques can be used to discover the likelihood of




The primary objective of this research was to examine a large dataset of historic IPv4
traceroute data in order to identify and classify artifacts. Using the methods discussed in
Chapter 3, we flagged hundreds of thousands of anomalous traceroutes. Across 5 years
of CAIDA traceroute data, 561,178 traceroutes displayed many hops in the same /24 IPv4
address space, while 340,382 exhibited sequential IPIDs. These quantities are far too great
to individually analyze each instance. However, since the traceroutes and their respective
hops are within our database, we are able to rapidly query for results as well as compare
against other datasets such as the historical DNS dataset from CAIDA.
We also wanted to enumerate, and perform a deeper analysis, of traceroutes that display
both artifact characteristics. In our selected CAIDA traceroute data over the 5 years,
we discovered 73 traceroutes which display both consecutive IPIDs and have many IPv4
addresses in the same /24. We will perform a more in-depth analysis on these 73 traceroutes.
The rest of this chapter focuses on finding trends within this large number of artifacts and
exploring explanations for said artifacts.
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Table 4.1. Summary table of suspicious traceroutes that are closely exam-
ined. Seq. IPID and Same /24 columns contain the number of hops display-
ing the observed anomalous characteristics, where a “*” next to the number
means it varies between instances observed. Protocols refer to receptiveness
to different probing techniques. Breadth is the range of destinations where
an artifact will manifest if probed. Multi-VPs indicate whether the tracer-
oute is observed from multiple VP within our dataset. The last column,






Protocols Duration Breadth Multi-
VPs
Occ.




1 IP Yes 3
Badhorse 0 27 All 2014-
Present
1 IP Yes 4










Table 4.1 represents the suspicious traceroutes observed in our CAIDA traceroute data that
we closely examined. This table serves as a summary of the findings that will be discussed
below, as each traceroute will be discussed in detail in Section 4.2. Section 4.1 will display
macroscopic statistics and analysis of all of our identified anomalous traceroutes.
4.1 Macro Statistics on Anomalous Traceroutes
As discussed in section 3.1, we are interested in finding sequential IPIDs and many IP
addresses on a path in the same /24. To facilitate that, we can utilize our suspicious
traceroute table within our database to query.
With our interest in ASs, we looked into what is the most commonly occurring ASN by hops
and by traceroute count. Table 4.2 represents the top 5 ASNs that were flagged as having
traceroute artifacts of 5 or more unique hops within the same /24 or 5 or more sequential
IPIDs.
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The percentage is based on the sum of all suspicious hops for a given ASN divided by
the sum of all suspicious hops in the entire table. The table also includes ASN 0, which
indicates that there was no associated ASN within the queried RIB file. These hops could
be part of a traceroute artifact example that includes many hops, perhaps dozens, until the
traceroute times out. These artifacts can sometimes extend many hops, and therefore could
contribute to higher counts in the suspicious count column, skewing the results. However,
we believe looking at the artifact hop count is still useful for understanding the ASN which
contribute most toward the artifacts.
Table 4.3 accounts for the multiple hops potentially skewing results by only considering one
ASN instance of an artifact per traceroute. In other words, even if an ASN were responsible
for multiple consecutive IPIDs within a traceroute, it would only be counted once.
In both Tables 4.2 and 4.3, PROXAD is the leading contributor to the suspicious hop and
traceroutes. PROXAD is a French telecommunications company, known as “Free” [48].
Table 4.2. Top ASN percentages for detected suspicious traceroutes by hop
Suspicious Hop Count and Percentage by ASN
ASN AS Name Suspicious Count Percentage
All - 20,390,676 100%
12322 PROXAD 6,743,134 33%
0 - 5,177,520 25%
174 Cogent Com. 1,379,537 7%
786 JANET 679,482 3%
3292 TDC 508,122 2%
3356 LEVEL3 309,193 1.5%
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Table 4.3. Top ASN percentages for detected Suspicious Traceroutes. The
“Suspicious Count” column represents the amount of unique traceroute-ASN
pairs.
Count of Suspicious Unique Trace-ASN Pairs and Percentage of Total by ASN
ASN AS Name Suspicious Count Percentage
All - 2,806,606 100%
12322 PROXAD 399,570 14%
0 - 329,651 12%
174 Cogent Com. 172,975 6%
9902 Neocomisp 95,928 3%
701 Verizon 74,887 3%
3292 TDC 72,835 3%
16086 DNA Oyj 71,689 3%
3356 LEVEL3 71,335 3%
4.2 DNS Findings of Detected Suspicious Traceroutes
This DNS Findings section refers to searching for interesting DNS strings in the set of
traceroutes already identified as having anomalous characteristics. As part of our research
into suspicious traceroutes, we continue to look at the DNS names associated with the hops
along these traceroute paths. While many of the hops of the suspicious traceroutes have no
matching entry in the historical DNS database, the ones that do provide us with insights into
the entities being crossed, such as large ISP names associated with their routers. Even more
interesting are the traceroutes in our Suspicious Traceroute Table (in our database), that
appear to be known traceroute gags. With known traceroute gags, we have the advantage of
searching for strings within the gags to identify them in the historical datasets. Unknown
traceroute gags require more e ort to identify through manual examination of the DNS
names paired with the suspicious traceroutes.
4.2.1 Star Wars Traceroute Gag Findings
Initially, we were unable to find the gag through a string search because it does not explicitly
announce itself as a “Star Wars” themed traceroute, as can be seen in Figure 4.1. Searching
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for “episode.iv” across the entire DNS dataset would have likely led to the traceroute gag
given enough time. However, without knowing the approximate month, these grep searches
can take a substantial amount of time for each string in the entire historical DNS dataset.
Narrowing down searches to the month by looking for the traceroute gag characteristics first
is far more e cient.
That being said, we searched for the string “star” in an attempt to be more thorough. The
search returned more than just the Star Wars Traceroute gag, which we identified before
the search completed by its anomalous characteristics. It also returns a large amount of
suspicious traceroutes most of which are making use of MPLS from ASN 8359 (MTS
PJSC), the largest mobile operator in Russia. These appear in the database as “alfa-
bank.moscow.access.comstar.ru”. Also, the Singapore Government Network, ASN 4657,
has the name “Starhub-Internet”, which appeared many times.
Without a specific string to search for and an approximate time, historical DNS searches can
be unwieldy. However, when examining instances of anomalous traceroutes that demon-
strated both of the anomalous characteristics (consecutive IPIDs and many IPv4 addresses
in the same /24), we discovered a previously unknown Star Wars Traceroute Gag. This
provides an example of our techniques being able to discover such traceroute gags in the
“wild” Internet.
Our technique was to first identify our subset of suspicious traceroutes using the algorithms
discussed in Section 3.1. We matched each response IP address with the corresponding
historical DNS name. This allowed us to identify the iconic scrolling “Star Wars” title.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates one instance in time of the discovered Star Wars Traceroute, as
well as some of the corresponding data in our database. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the
sequential IPIDs values as well as the IP addresses in the same /24.
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hop_ip | ipid | dns
----------------+-------+---------------------------------------------
139.18.1.254 | 1 | augate-if.rz.uni-leipzig.de
139.18.122.87 | 2 | clusaug-if.rz.uni-leipzig.de
188.1.239.49 | 63591 | cr-lap1-be3.x-win.dfn.de
188.1.144.26 | 58414 | cr-tub2-hundredgige0-9-0-5.x-win.dfn.de
188.1.144.57 | 54013 | cr-ham1-hundredgige0-1-0-0.x-win.dfn.de
188.1.244.178 | 0 | kr-ros51.x-win.dfn.de
139.30.0.20 | 7 | nx1-gate.uni-rostock.de
139.30.253.117 | 8050 | FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
139.30.208.195 | 9971 | episode.iv--------------------------------l
139.30.208.135 | 9972 | a.new.hope--------------------------------l
139.30.208.137 | 9973 | a.long.time.ago.in.a.galaxy.far.far.away--l
139.30.208.139 | 9974 | it.is.a.period.of.civil.war.rebel---------l
139.30.208.141 | 9975 | spaceships.striking.from.a.hidden---------l
139.30.208.143 | 9976 | base.have.won.their.first.victory---------l
139.30.208.145 | 9977 | against.the.evil.galactic.empire----------l
139.30.208.147 | 9978 | during.the.battle.rebel.spies.managed-----l
139.30.208.149 | 9979 | to.steal.secret.plans.to.the.empires------l
139.30.208.151 | 9980 | ultimate.weapon.the.death.star.an---------l
139.30.208.153 | 9981 | armored.space.station.with.enough---------l
139.30.208.155 | 9982 | power.to.destroy.an.entire.planet---------l
139.30.208.157 | 9983 | pursued.by.the.empires.sinister.agents----l
139.30.208.159 | 9984 | princess.leia.races.home.aboard.her-------l
139.30.208.161 | 9985 | starship.custodian.of.the.stolen.plans----l
139.30.208.163 | 9986 | that.can.save.her.people.and.restore------l
139.30.208.165 | 9987 | freedom.to.the.galaxy---------------------l
139.30.208.132 | 26 | may.the.force.be.with.you-----------------l
Figure 4.1. Star Wars Traceroute discovered
Now that we had discovered this Star Wars Traceroute, we wanted to determine if the
traceroute gag was still active. Performing multiple traceroutes from the original VP
utilizing ICMP-Paris showed that the traceroute gag was not active. UDP-Paris and TCP
traceroutes were attempted as well with no success. We also tried probing addresses within
the same /24 as the original destination. The IP address 139.30.208.195 provides a response
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to an ICMP-Paris or TCP probe, but not UDP-Paris. None of the other IP addresses in
the same /24 respond. However, when searching for the individual DNS names by their
corresponding hop IP addresses, they all still resolve to their original strings.
Since the traceroute was unable to be actively probed, we decided to attempt to identify
when the traceroute gag stopped being operational. The instance demonstrated in Figure 4.1
is from 2016-01-02. One way to approximate when the traceroute gag ended is to look at
the historical DNS. From viewing Figure 4.3, it appears that the traceroute gag was active

























































Figure 4.2. Star Wars Traceroute search for “episode.iv” within the historical





Figure 4.3. Star Wars Traceroute search for “may.the.force.be.with.you”
within the historical DNS in 2017. The command used: find . -name “*.gz”
| xargs -n 1 -P 10 zgrep -H “may.the.force.be.with.you”
Figure 4.2 shows the 2017 results for a search of “episode.iv”. Within this search, we also
noticed a “frontend.episode-iv.de” and “ridcully.episode-iv.de”, which are present in the
previous years as well. Seeing that one of these DNS names is “frontend”, it would seem
logical to attempt to access the IP address associated with it. Both IP addresses point to
the simple website shown in Figure 4.4. Traceroutes to these addresses do not produce the
traceroute gag.
Figure 4.4. Both IP addresses associated with “frontend.episode-iv.de” and
“ridcully.episode-iv.de” point to this website as of 2018-03-11
4.2.2 Bad.horse Traceroute Gag Findings
The Bad.horse traceroute gag is known to us publicly through news and enthusiast forms
[49], [50]. We were able to find 5 instances of the Bad.horse Traceroute gag in our CAIDA
traceroute data, which is still active at the time of this writing [34]. See Figure 4.5, which
shows a single traceroute to the “bad.horse” destination using the default traceroute client
with default settings in linux. The returning DNS names are part of a song from the
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referenced video. Visiting “bad.horse” in a web browser will provide you with a video
associated with the traceroute gag.
traceroute to bad.horse (162.252.205.157), 50 hops max, 60 byte packets
1 thunder.caida.org (192.172.226.253) 0.359 ms 1.037 ms 1.009 ms
2 bwctl9.sdsc.edu (192.12.207.9) 0.325 ms 0.353 ms 0.338 ms
3 dc-sdg-agg4--sdsc-1.cenic.net (137.164.23.129) 0.782 ms 0.813 ms 0.894 ms
4 137.164.11.10 (137.164.11.10) 2.450 ms 2.481 ms dc-tus-agg3--sdg-agg4-100ge.cenic.net (137.164.11.8) 2.517 ms
5 137.164.11.22 (137.164.11.22) 3.269 ms 3.278 ms 3.265 ms
6 * * *
7 * * *
8 las-b21-link.telia.net (80.239.195.60) 3.061 ms 3.575 ms 3.537 ms
9 las-b24-link.telia.net (62.115.136.47) 12.868 ms 11.703 ms 11.672 ms
10 atlanticmetro-ic-306052-las-b3.c.telia.net (62.115.42.54) 3.210 ms 3.122 ms 3.249 ms
11 ve1450.cr2.lga3.atlanticmetro.net (108.60.128.73) 75.686 ms 70.486 ms 71.880 ms
12 e6-3.cr1.lga12.atlanticmetro.net (108.60.148.78) 73.800 ms 73.631 ms 70.503 ms
13 e2-20.cr2.lga11.atlanticmetro.net (69.9.32.221) 73.366 ms 72.215 ms 74.325 ms
14 t03.nycmc1.ny.us.sn11.net (162.252.205.4) 101.313 ms 94.933 ms 93.523 ms
15 bad.horse (162.252.205.130) 93.975 ms 92.837 ms 93.328 ms
16 bad.horse (162.252.205.131) 104.648 ms 107.939 ms 106.458 ms
17 bad.horse (162.252.205.132) 108.636 ms 109.131 ms 103.074 ms
18 bad.horse (162.252.205.133) 108.648 ms 107.530 ms 112.525 ms
19 he.rides.across.the.nation (162.252.205.134) 116.155 ms 119.027 ms 115.260 ms
20 the.thoroughbred.of.sin (162.252.205.135) 129.049 ms 124.693 ms 128.101 ms
21 he.got.the.application (162.252.205.136) 123.583 ms 126.720 ms 126.717 ms
22 that.you.just.sent.in (162.252.205.137) 130.120 ms 126.396 ms 128.390 ms
23 it.needs.evaluation (162.252.205.138) 150.720 ms 144.407 ms 144.404 ms
24 so.let.the.games.begin (162.252.205.139) 143.431 ms 144.525 ms 143.636 ms
25 a.heinous.crime (162.252.205.140) 151.507 ms 151.276 ms 150.888 ms
26 a.show.of.force (162.252.205.141) 151.534 ms 151.292 ms 153.595 ms
27 a.murder.would.be.nice.of.course (162.252.205.142) 154.684 ms 160.003 ms 158.527 ms
28 bad.horse (162.252.205.143) 163.447 ms 165.010 ms 164.151 ms
29 bad.horse (162.252.205.144) 176.849 ms 174.031 ms 175.667 ms
30 bad.horse (162.252.205.145) 171.615 ms 187.756 ms 175.138 ms
31 he-s.bad (162.252.205.146) 177.826 ms 181.542 ms 179.771 ms
32 the.evil.league.of.evil (162.252.205.147) 183.206 ms 186.902 ms 183.323 ms
33 is.watching.so.beware (162.252.205.148) 184.541 ms 184.739 ms 182.833 ms
34 the.grade.that.you.receive (162.252.205.149) 193.063 ms 190.923 ms 189.881 ms
35 will.be.your.last.we.swear (162.252.205.150) 205.969 ms 202.697 ms 203.023 ms
36 so.make.the.bad.horse.gleeful (162.252.205.151) 208.786 ms 200.288 ms 209.764 ms
37 or.he-ll.make.you.his.mare (162.252.205.152) 205.680 ms 205.338 ms 206.433 ms
38 o_o (162.252.205.153) 213.477 ms 213.171 ms 213.788 ms
39 you-re.saddled.up (162.252.205.154) 220.033 ms 218.396 ms 217.518 ms
40 there-s.no.recourse (162.252.205.155) 228.576 ms 231.465 ms 224.031 ms
41 it-s.hi-ho.silver (162.252.205.156) 225.696 ms 227.416 ms 237.066 ms
42 signed.bad.horse (162.252.205.157) 235.920 ms 228.957 ms 230.351 ms
Figure 4.5. Traceroute from 2018-3-29 using the command: traceroute -m
50 bad.horse
We discovered this specific, known, gag by simply searching for the string “horse” in our
suspicious traceroute table. Figure 4.6 demonstrates what was returned when searching for
the string in the table.
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traceanalysis=> select hop_ip, trace_id, dns from suspicious where dns LIKE ’%horse%’;
hop_ip | trace_id | dns
-----------------+------------+-------------------------------
162.252.205.145 | 3250435396 | bad.horse
162.252.205.131 | 3250435396 | bad.horse
162.252.205.130 | 2284610512 | bad.horse
162.252.205.131 | 2284610512 | bad.horse
162.252.205.132 | 2284610512 | bad.horse
162.252.205.133 | 2284610512 | bad.horse
162.252.205.143 | 2284610512 | bad.horse
162.252.205.144 | 2284610512 | bad.horse
162.252.205.145 | 2284610512 | bad.horse
162.252.205.157 | 2284610512 | signed.bad.horse
162.252.205.151 | 2284610512 | so.make.the.bad.horse.gleeful
162.252.205.194 | 1153505021 | bad.horse
162.252.205.133 | 3250435396 | bad.horse
162.252.205.132 | 3250435396 | bad.horse
162.252.205.143 | 3250435396 | bad.horse
162.252.205.144 | 3250435396 | bad.horse
162.252.205.151 | 3034559376 | so.make.the.bad.horse.gleeful
162.252.205.157 | 3034559376 | signed.bad.horse
162.252.205.151 | 3250435396 | so.make.the.bad.horse.gleeful
162.252.205.157 | 3250435396 | signed.bad.horse
(20 rows)
Figure 4.6. Bad.horse instances found in the suspicious traceroute table’s
DNS column
Figure 4.7 displays a complete instance of a Bad.horse Traceroute found within our dataset.
It clearly demonstrates the artifact characteristic of having many IP addresses within the
same /24, but it does not demonstrate the consecutive IPIDs characteristic. This particular
example of finding a traceroute gag acts as validation that we are able to find active traceroute
gags within our database.
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traceanalysis=> select hop_ip, ipid, dns from suspicious where trace_id = 2284610512 order by probe_ttl;
hop_ip | ipid | dns
-----------------+-------+-----------------------------------------------
84.88.81.121 | 0 | FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
84.88.19.149 | 56446 | anella-ccaba-upc.cesca.cat
130.206.211.69 | 0 | anella-val1.ae2-454.uv.rt1.val.red.rediris.es
130.206.245.90 | 0 | uv.ae5.telmad.rt4.mad.red.rediris.es
62.40.124.192 | 0 | rediris.mx1.gen.ch.geant.net
62.40.98.113 | 0 | ae1.mx1.mil2.it.geant.net
217.29.66.125 | 39158 | he.mix-it.net
184.105.222.129 | 41703 | 10ge3-3.core1.zrh1.he.net
184.105.222.49 | 46401 | 10ge7-17.core1.par2.he.net
184.105.81.77 | 63769 | 100ge7-1.core1.nyc4.he.net
184.105.223.161 | 58246 | 100ge7-2.core1.chi1.he.net
184.105.223.178 | 34737 | 100ge10-1.core1.msp1.he.net
216.66.78.110 | 0 | ip-house.gigabitethernet3-6.core1.msp1.he.net
216.250.189.170 | 56428 | c4500-1.mpls.iphouse.net
209.240.64.149 | 4091 | egw-iphouse.mplsc1.mn.us.sn11.net
162.252.204.66 | 28385 | t00.nycmc1.ny.us.sn11.net
162.252.205.130 | 63695 | bad.horse
162.252.205.131 | 54557 | bad.horse
162.252.205.132 | 34837 | bad.horse
162.252.205.133 | 20304 | bad.horse
162.252.205.134 | 3166 | he.rides.across.the.nation
162.252.205.135 | 47726 | the.thoroughbred.of.sin
162.252.205.136 | 49814 | he.got.the.application
162.252.205.137 | 6048 | that.you.just.sent.in
162.252.205.138 | 21211 | it.needs.evaluation
162.252.205.139 | 30008 | so.let.the.games.begin
162.252.205.140 | 32623 | a.heinous.crime
162.252.205.141 | 25898 | a.show.of.force
162.252.205.142 | 22754 | a.murder.would.be.nice.of.course
162.252.205.143 | 24325 | bad.horse
162.252.205.144 | 9582 | bad.horse
162.252.205.145 | 32850 | bad.horse
162.252.205.146 | 27480 | he-s.bad
162.252.205.147 | 6554 | the.evil.league.of.evil
162.252.205.148 | 43612 | is.watching.so.beware
162.252.205.149 | 36701 | the.grade.that.you.receive
162.252.205.150 | 47416 | will.be.your.last.we.swear
162.252.205.151 | 38223 | so.make.the.bad.horse.gleeful
162.252.205.152 | 41114 | or.he-ll.make.you.his.mare
162.252.205.153 | 55506 | o\x5fo
162.252.205.154 | 65279 | you-re.saddled.up
162.252.205.155 | 58301 | there-s.no.recourse
162.252.205.156 | 44206 | it-s.hi-ho.silver
162.252.205.157 | 31904 | signed.bad.horse
(44 rows)
Figure 4.7. One instance of Bad.horse Traceroute with corresponding DNS
names.
42
4.3 Traceroutes with Both Anomalous Characteristics
In this section, we analyze the 73 traceroutes that display consecutive IPIDs and Many IP
Addresses in same /24. These 73 traceroutes involve repetitions of the same or similar
destinations in the same /24 over the 5 years of this CAIDA traceroute data, indicating an
approximate life span of the artifact. For example, 89.133.20.0/24 appears multiple times
from 2013 until 2016. It does not make any appearance in 2017. Some of these traceroutes
include a highly unusual amount of responses ranging from hundreds to over 2,000 total
responses to less than 20 probes. We discuss these specific anomalous traceroutes in this
section in greater detail and describe them as a new classification of artifact.
4.3.1 Befree Destinations
Nearly half of our 73 identified anomalous traceroutes are the same artifact repeated over
4 years. 32 of our 73 traceroutes that display both anomalous characteristics are in the
89.113.20.0/24 address space. Table 4.4 shows the distribution over our CAIDA traceroute
data timeline. Many of these traces traverse through an IP address with a DNS name
of “gw-befree.retn.net” before continuing on to repeated responses of 89.113.16.69 with
incrementing IPIDs. The IP address associated with “gw-befree.retn.net” belongs to ASN
9002 (RETN), an international ISP. This IP address appears to be a gateway, which o ers
the numerous incrementing IPIDs responses all of which belong to ASN 39749 (Befree)
and are of the same IP address.
Other instances of these 32 that do not traverse the “befree gateway”, but still have
Befree destinations, instead traverse Russian domain names, such as “spb-81-211-88-
182.sovintel.spb.ru”, associated with ASN 3216 (PJSC VimpelCom). One instance of
this traceroute, which traverses the Russian domain, originated from a VP in Canada. An-
other instance run just prior to this was from a VP in the Netherlands and resulted in the
“befree gateway”.
Running a traceroute in 2018 with UDP-Paris, from the same Canadian VP, to 89.113.20.25
stops at the same IP address with the domain name “spb-81-211-88-182.sovintel.spb.ru”.
Running another traceroute with the same settings but from a VP in the Netherlands results
in only 5 hops and then stops before proceeding as far as from the Canadian VP. Probing
with ICMP-Paris and TCP produces the same result.
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Table 4.4. Count of the 89.113.20.0/24 anomalous traces









Within our group of 73 suspicious traceroutes that display both characteristics over 5 years,
3 of the 73 destinations belong to the Russian ISP, MTS. MTS is also known as Comstar,
which is the name that appears in the historical DNS associated with the responses. These
3 traces have destinations in the 89.175.85.0/24 space and were active in 2013, with the last
known one occurring on 2016-04-26. Nearly all of the responses contain ICMP extension,
indicating MPLS, although it is not clear that the trace traverses a tunnel. Many of the
responses including ICMP extension are multiple responses to a single probe, perhaps
indicating that the trace does not actually traverse the tunnel but instead reveals multiple
di erent MPLS addresses. These addresses could be di erent MPLS ingress routers or
interfaces. Figure 4.8 demonstrates some of the over 600 responses of one of the instances.
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hop_ip | ipid | asn | probe | dns
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+------------------------------------------
195.206.249.17 | 43444 | 49770 | 2 | FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
95.143.207.173 | 44803 | 49770 | 3 | FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
95.143.207.229 | 0 | 49770 | 4 | mx-core1.internetport.se
213.132.98.113 | 31269 | 12552 | 5 | FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
83.145.21.205 | 0 | 24862 | 6 | FAIL.NON-AUTHORITATIVE.in-addr.arpa
194.68.128.161 | 13897 | 9902 | 7 | netnod-ix-ge-b-sth-1500.mts.ru
195.34.50.166 | 58460 | 8359 | 8 | oct-cr03-be5.278.spb.stream-internet.net
212.188.2.38 | 786 | 8359 | 9 | mag9-cr01-be1.78.msk.stream-internet.net
195.34.50.150 | 42526 | 8359 | 10 | ss-cr04-be2.77.msk.stream-internet.net
195.34.59.106 | 23379 | 8359 | 11 | a197-cr04-be5.77.msk.stream-internet.net
195.34.53.5 | 27287 | 8359 | 12 | ss-cr02-po2.221.msk.stream-internet.net
195.210.128.105 | 0 | 8359 | 13 | asr-sm-0.moscow.core.comstar.ru
212.248.3.221 | 9194 | 8359 | 14 | bb-sm-1-ge-4-22.moscow.core.comstar.ru
82.204.255.246 | 48226 | 8359 | 15 | bb-tg-0-te5-3.moscow.core.comstar.ru
212.248.3.146 | 38232 | 8359 | 16 | ngn-7606-te3-0-1.moscow.core.comstar.ru
89.175.143.33 | 27233 | 8359 | 19 | rusdel4.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.190 | 40936 | 8359 | 19 | interprombank2.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.226.45 | 23196 | 8359 | 19 | FAIL.SERVER-FAILURE.in-addr.arpa
89.175.143.179 | 12564 | 8359 | 19 | interprombank.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.19 | 34784 | 8359 | 19 | newstep.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.18 | 58451 | 8359 | 19 | monarossi.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.73 | 63660 | 8359 | 19 | mroformitel.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.31 | 15563 | 8359 | 19 | rusdel2.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.152 | 43174 | 8359 | 19 | bershka.moscow.access.comstar.ru
Figure 4.8. Partial example of one instance of the Comstar anomalous tracer-
outes
Another instance of this Comstar anomaly is demonstrated in Figure 4.9, with over
1000 responses. Hundreds of responses are generated in response to probe 30 alone,
with corresponding DNS names that refer to di erent businesses (interprombank, monex,
zara). Probe 31 then generates hundreds more responses with 89.175.143.1, “cr-145-
vl2620.access.comstar.ru”, as the only response. This name may potentially refer to the
model of the router, perhaps a Cisco 2620, while “vl” could refer to “Virtual Lan”. Fig-
ure 4.10 shows the third instance, which has over 700 responses. Figure 4.10 demonstrates
the same anomaly observed in Figure 4.9, however the order of the probe responses are
reversed.
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89.175.143.1 | 22150 | 8359 | 30 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 22151 | 8359 | 30 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 22128 | 8359 | 30 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 22183 | 8359 | 30 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 22152 | 8359 | 30 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 22153 | 8359 | 30 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 22154 | 8359 | 30 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 22155 | 8359 | 30 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 22156 | 8359 | 30 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 22157 | 8359 | 30 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.249 | 47233 | 8359 | 31 | diva.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.111 | 839 | 8359 | 31 | goldstreet.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.107 | 46023 | 8359 | 31 | fashiongroup.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.34 | 60779 | 8359 | 31 | skyter.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.107 | 46029 | 8359 | 31 | fashiongroup.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.34 | 60785 | 8359 | 31 | skyter.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.18 | 33367 | 8359 | 31 | monarossi.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.145 | 15503 | 8359 | 31 | lpk.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.107 | 46034 | 8359 | 31 | fashiongroup.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.236 | 52386 | 8359 | 31 | italikam.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.89 | 43502 | 8359 | 31 | edinayevropasb.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.249 | 47234 | 8359 | 31 | diva.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.20 | 29008 | 8359 | 31 | system-fd.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.111 | 840 | 8359 | 31 | goldstreet.moscow.access.comstar.ru
Figure 4.9. Demonstration of multiple responses to probe 30 and 31 for
another instance of the Comstar anomalous traceroutes
89.175.226.23 | 42866 | 8359 | 30 | adidas.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.226.56 | 37857 | 8359 | 30 | edan.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.42 | 53581 | 8359 | 30 | sanfeshn.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.7 | 24476 | 8359 | 30 | veter2.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.100 | 59429 | 8359 | 30 | restorants.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.226.32 | 55588 | 8359 | 30 | adidas.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.221 | 55086 | 8359 | 30 | ravelo.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.226.5 | 54609 | 8359 | 30 | interjazz.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.226.56 | 37858 | 8359 | 30 | edan.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.226.28 | 53634 | 8359 | 30 | rusmoda.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.226.33 | 7099 | 8359 | 30 | nrgroup.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.42 | 53582 | 8359 | 30 | sanfeshn.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.7 | 24477 | 8359 | 30 | veter2.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.100 | 59430 | 8359 | 30 | restorants.moscow.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 48906 | 8359 | 31 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 48592 | 8359 | 31 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 48594 | 8359 | 31 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 48595 | 8359 | 31 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 48596 | 8359 | 31 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
89.175.143.1 | 48597 | 8359 | 31 | cr-145-vl2620.access.comstar.ru
Figure 4.10. Reverse order of responses to probes for another instance
Active probes to the original destinations do not replicate this anomaly and appear to stop
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at “last-hop2-ngn.comstar.ru” before the gap limit is exceeded. This could possibly indicate
that this was unintended information leakage for this ISP and they corrected the problem
sometime between 2016 and 2017.
4.3.3 Other Traceroutes with Many Responses to a Single Probe
This newly observed characteristic of many responses to a single probe seems to be common
across a number of the 73 traceroutes exhibiting both characteristics, with some ranging
from a few responses while others contain thousands. Section 4.3.1 is an example of this
characteristic of multiple responses to a single probe. The traces actually do not demonstrate
many IP addresses in the same /24, since it does not display multiple hops. Instead, multiple
identical responses to a single probe are provided.
We observe one instance of a traceroute with over 2000 responses. Similar to the artifact
discussed in 4.3.2, there are many identical responses to one probe followed by thousands of
responses in the 200.32.179.0/24 address space to another probe. With this particular arti-
fact, there are no corresponding DNS results. Active probes sent to the original destination
do not demonstrate the artifact, which first appeared in 2013.
While we correctly identified these traceroutes as being anomalous, they do not fit well into
our original artifact classifications. Therefore, we propose a new characteristic to look for
when researching traceroute artifacts. In addition to traceroutes that contain many hops
with IP addresses in the same /24, traceroutes with many responses to a single probe should
be considered as anomalous behavior. However, these artifacts are not mutually exclusive.
Just as in this section, we identified 73 instances of traceroutes displaying sequential IPIDs
and many IP addresses in the same /24, it is possible for a subset of these to also contain the
many responses characteristic. Figure 4.11 demonstrates the possible overlap of anomalous
behaviors. For example, most traceroutes observed with many responses to a single probe
likely had those responses come from a single interface or router due to the incrementing
IPIDs that were also present.
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Figure 4.11. Venn diagram of different traceroute artifact behaviors
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CHAPTER 5:
Longitudinal Analysis of MPLS Results
As stated in Chapter 4, the goal of this thesis is to examine a large dataset of historic IPv4
traceroute data in order to identify and classify artifacts. In pursuit of this goal, we formed
a hypothesis that MPLS could be responsible for a subset of these artifacts. Using the
methodology described in Chapter 3, we hope to discover trends in the prevalence of MPLS
tunnels that may influence the frequency in appearance of these artifacts. We also hope to
discover deceptive practices in the "wild" Internet by studying these historical datasets. We
will focus our research on the two artifact types discussed in subsections 3.1.1 (Sequential
IPIDs) and 3.1.2 (Many IP addresses in the same /24).
5.1 MPLS Prevalence Across all VPs
Figure 5.1 is a boxplot representation of all VPs in our dataset. For each year, every instance
of a VP is represented by the percentage of traceroutes that traversed a MPLS tunnel. The
x-axis represents each year of our dataset, from 2013 until 2017. The y-axis represents the
percentage of traceroutes that traverse an MPLS tunnel. While the median percentage in
2013 is 46%, many outliers appear near 100%. This could indicate that these monitors are
only a few hops away from an ISP utilizing MPLS, guaranteeing most destinations must go
through a tunnel. There also appears to be outliers on the bottom tails that may indicate
that these VPs are passing through a high number of ASs that are not utilizing MPLS or not
advertising their use of MPLS.
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Figure 5.1. Percentage of traces that traverse a MPLS tunnel across all
Team 1 vantage points
Table 5.1. Median percentages, by year, for all VP traceroutes traversing an
MPLS tunnel







MPLS prevalence across all monitors in the entire dataset for team 1 from 2013 through 2017
remained relatively stable, although the median percentage did drop to a low of 33% in 2015,
a trend shared by many of the VPs surveyed later in this chapter. The median percentage
of traceroutes that traversed an MPLS tunnel range from approximately 33% in 2015 to
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46% in 2013, which is noticeably higher than the 30% in 2011, discovered by previous
research [35]. Despite being higher, the percentage is still within a reasonable di erence
when considering MPLS utilization has likely increased as large ISP continually optimize
their networks for increased tra c since 2011. Donnet et al. discovered approximately 30%
of paths tested traversed an MPLS tunnel from data collected in 2011 [35]. They utilized
25 PlanetLab VPs and collected all data on 2011-08-24 [35]. Donnet et al. used scamper,
the same tool that CAIDA uses to collect their CTD [21].
However, when looking at the data more closely it is apparent that there are large variations
between certain monitors. Figure 5.1 demonstrates this quite clearly by showing many
outliers in the boxplot, specifically the many outliers near 100% of traceroutes that traverse
a MPLS router in years 2013 and 2015. By querying our database for the VPs with the
largest MPLS percentages per cycle in yearly time periods, we are able to identify one
monitor that is contributing to these outliers. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 demonstrates that New
Orleans, Louisiana (msy-us) is one such VP contributing to the outliers in 2013 and 2014,
likely because of being a few hops away from a large ISP heavily utilizing MPLS. We will
delve into the msy-us VP later in Section 5.2.2.
Table 5.2. msy-us is responsible for a large number of cycles which had total
or near 100% MPLS tunnels per trace in 2013.













Table 5.3. msy-us had many cycles in 2014 that had 100% of traceroutes
traverse an MPLS tunnel












Therefore, due to these large variations between di erent VPs, it is necessary to look at
percentages of traces traversing an MPLS router on a per-vantage point basis to better
understand these trends. The following vantage points come from team 1 in the dataset.
They are spread across the globe with at least one monitor positioned on the American,
South American, African, Asian, Australian, and European continents. Many of the vantage
points displayed dramatic increases or decreases in the percentage of traces that traversed an
MPLS tunnel from year to year. One potential cause could be a large ISP moving away from
utilizing MPLS for optimization of tra c and moving toward another technology. Another
possibility could be that peering arrangements and agreements have changed between the
large ISPs. And yet another possibility is that the large ISPs have not reduced their usage
of MPLS at all, but instead are no longer advertising publicly the MPLS within their
infrastructure.
5.2 Individual Analysis of MPLS Prevalence by VPs
If a large ISP is no longer utilizing MPLS, we would expect to see that particular ISP AS
number appearance to drop from one year to the next. The first step is to find all traceroute
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hop IP addresses associated with MPLS, meaning we have determined them to be a hop
as part of an MPLS tunnel, and match them with their corresponding AS number. In our
database, we stored hops of a traceroute that appeared to have any form of MPLS (explicit,
implicit, or opaque). By looking at these IP addresses and matching them with an AS
number utilizing a route views RIB file from that month and year, we can then gather a
count of the AS numbers for that vantage point for that year. If we notice a trend across
multiple VPs for a specific ASN, our confidence that the ASN is the responsible party to
the change in frequency of MPLS will be higher.
5.2.1 Dublin, Ireland, VP
Figure 5.2 represents Dublin, Ireland’s VP over a time period of 5 years as a boxplot. This
represents every single cycle that the Dublin VP participated in during this time period. The
x-axis represents each year of our dataset, between 2013 until 2017. The y-axis represents
the percentage of traceroutes that traverse an MPLS tunnel. There is a noticeable drop in
the percentage of traces that traverse an MPLS tunnel between 2014 and 2015. Table 5.4
displays the percentage change between years, 2015 being the lowest.
Figure 5.2. Dublin, Ireland
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Table 5.4. Dublin, Ireland, VP traceroutes traversing an MPLS tunnel per-
centages by year







Table 5.5. Top 10 ASN appearances for Dublin VP in 2014












By examining the count of each hop’s ASN in Table 5.5, we see that the top result in 2014
was ASN 3356, which according to as-rank.caida.org [48] is the AS number associated
with Level 3 Communications. Level 3 accounted for 67% of all MPLS tunnels traversed
in 2014 from the Dublin, Ireland vantage point. The number two most traversed ASN with
MPLS tunnels was ASN 7018 with 9% of all MPLS tunnels traversed in 2014 from the
Dublin, Ireland monitor. ASN 7018 belongs to AT&T Services.
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Table 5.6. Top 10 ASN appearances for Dublin VP in 2015












ASN 3356 went from a count of more than 134 million in 2014 to not even being represented
in the top 10 in 2015. ASN 3356 count for 2015 was 48,291, representing a mere .06% of
all MPLS tunnels. ASN 7018 moved up in position to number one, accounting for 21% of
all MPLS tunnels.
Table 5.7. Dublin, Ireland, VP notable ASN changes
Change in percent of MPLS tunnels by notable AS
ASN AS Name 2014 Percentage 2015 Percentage
3356 LEVEL3 67% <1%
7018 AT&T 9% 21%
2914 NTT America 4.5% 16%
6453 TATA COM. 2.7% 8%
2828 Verizon Business 1% 5%
Figure 5.7 demonstrates the changes of notable ASNs in percentage of hops detected to be
part of an MPLS tunnel between 2014 and 2015.
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5.2.2 New Orleans, Louisiana, United States, VP
Figure 5.3 representing New Orleans displays years 2013 and 2014 as having near 100%
of traces traversing an MPLS tunnel, then suddenly dropping down to near 30% in 2015.
Figure 5.3 represents information for the New Orleans VP in the same way that it was
represented in subsection 5.2.1.
Figure 5.3. Percentage of traceroutes that traverse a MPLS tunnel for the
VP in New Orleans, Louisiana, United States
Table 5.8. New Orleans VP traceroutes traversing an MPLS tunnel percent-
ages by year








The top two ASNs appear to be 22773 and 3356. ASN 22773 is associated with Cox
Communications while ASN 3356 is Level 3. Cox Communications appears to account for
39% of all MPLS tunnels while Level 3 accounts for 31%.
Table 5.9. Top 10 ASN appearances for New Orleans vantage point in 2013












In 2014, both Cox and Level 3 remain the top two, although they both experience a slight
decrease. Cox accounts for 36% while Level 3 accounts for 25%. The other ASNs in the
top 10 experience an increase.
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Table 5.10. Top 10 ASN appearances for New Orleans vantage point in 2014












In 2015, Cox and Level 3 disappear entirely from the top 10. Cox and Level 3 decrease to
.02% and .005%. ASN 2914, NTT America, takes over as the top ASN accounting for 16%
and showing an increase in utilization of MPLS from previous years.
Table 5.11. Top 10 ASN appearances for New Orleans vantage point in 2015













Table 5.12. New Orleans VP notable ASN changes
Change in percent of MPLS tunnels by notable AS
ASN AS Name 2013 2014 2015
22773 Cox Com. 39% 36% <1%
3356 LEVEL3 31% 25% <1%
7018 AT&T 6% 7% 15%
2914 NTT 4% 5% 16%
6461 Zayo 2% 3% 11%
Table 5.12 demonstrates the change in percent of hops that traverse an MPLS tunnel by
ASN. Cox and LEVEL3 clearly have made some change in their infrastructure which results
in the almost complete elimination of traceroute hops traversing an MPLS tunnel in 2015.
The other ASN do increase in percentage, however this is mostly due to the disappearance
of the previous top 2 as their MPLS hop count does not increase significantly, and in the
case of ASN 7018 the count actually decreases.
Based on Figure 5.3, it is obvious the median percentage of traces that traverse a MPLS
tunnel are lower in 2015. However, the bottom outliers in 2014 appear to indicate that the
trend towards the lower percentage may have started sometime within 2014. Therefore, we
look to our database in an attempt to pinpoint a particular date range when the downward
shift in traces that traverse a MPLS tunnel occurred.
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traceanalysis=> select x.monitor, x.cycle_START, X.PERC from
(select distinct on (monitor, cycle_start) monitor, cycle_start,
(mpls_cnt/trace_cnt::float) as perc from files where
cycle_start >= ’20140920’ and cycle_start < ’20141101’
and trace_cnt !=0 and monitor = ’msy-us’)x order by x.cycle_start asc;
monitor | cycle_start | perc
---------+---------------------+-------------------
msy-us | 2014-09-20 19:31:58 | 0.999985729779097
msy-us | 2014-09-22 07:14:58 | 1
msy-us | 2014-09-23 19:26:54 | 0.589769278150069
msy-us | 2014-09-25 06:59:27 | 0.338230006677282
msy-us | 2014-09-26 18:20:17 | 0.336733579773213
msy-us | 2014-09-28 05:50:16 | 0.335882511045037
msy-us | 2014-09-29 17:58:03 | 0.337114149117613
msy-us | 2014-10-01 08:16:05 | 0.332174828857293
msy-us | 2014-10-02 21:52:42 | 0.337209302325581
msy-us | 2014-10-04 10:05:37 | 0.33030270994115
msy-us | 2014-10-05 22:36:09 | 0.332686069860324
msy-us | 2014-10-07 11:04:28 | 0.331644277564114
msy-us | 2014-10-08 22:25:36 | 0.318520914068966
msy-us | 2014-10-10 11:13:01 | 0.306986300216401
msy-us | 2014-10-12 00:48:48 | 0.304582460749204
msy-us | 2014-10-13 14:59:14 | 0.308271311513473
msy-us | 2014-10-15 04:12:43 | 0.306724660268287
msy-us | 2014-10-16 16:02:21 | 0.302791001426435
msy-us | 2014-10-18 04:42:57 | 0.303879837565439
msy-us | 2014-10-19 19:02:08 | 0.30209726443769
msy-us | 2014-10-22 22:48:41 | 0.268631849085131
msy-us | 2014-10-24 12:05:33 | 0.267448723624022
msy-us | 2014-10-26 00:38:14 | 0.269964464735368
msy-us | 2014-10-27 13:16:24 | 0.268901967351691
msy-us | 2014-10-29 02:31:41 | 0.270672258773399
msy-us | 2014-10-30 15:47:55 | 0.268869366875201
(26 rows)
Figure 5.4. Downward shift by percentage of MPLS by cycle for the msy-us
VP
Figure 5.4 displays an approximate date and time for the start of the downward trend. From
2014-09-20 through 2014-09-22 we can observe the normal, expected, percentage from all
previous data in our dataset for the msy-us VP. However, from 2014-09-23 onwards we
observe a steady decrease in percentage. Based on our previous observations in Table 5.12,
we believe that September 23rd, 2014 is the approximate inflection point for when ASN
22773 (Cox) and 3356 (LEVEL3) made significant changes to their infrastructure, a ecting
MPLS routers within.
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5.2.3 Sao Paulo, Brazil, VP
Figure 5.5 demonstrates a noticeable upward trend in the percentage of traceroutes that
traverse a MPLS tunnel over each year. This is a di erent trend from what was observed
in figures 5.3 and 5.2. Table 5.13 also indicates that there is a clear percentage increase in
traceroutes traversing MPLS tunnels, starting from 45% up to 93%. Inspecting which ASN
is responsible for the MPLS tunnels is required to attempt an explanation.
Figure 5.5. Sao Paulo, Brazil
Table 5.13. Sao Paulo VP traceroutes traversing a MPLS tunnel percentages
by year








Table 5.14 demonstrates the continued trend of LEVEL3 (ASN 3356) accounting for less
of the traceroutes that traverse a MPLS tunnel, starting in 2015. However, what is di erent
about the Sao Paulo VP is that another telecom, ALGAR, increases in percentage to o set
the decline of LEVEL3. The other ASN remain around the same hops that traverse a MPLS
tunnel count and percentage.
Table 5.14. Sao Paulo VP notable ASN changes
Change in percent of MPLS tunnels by notable AS
ASN AS Name 2014 Percentage 2015 Percentage
16735 ALGAR 27% 54%
3356 LEVEL3 20% <1%
7018 AT&T 16% 10%
2914 NTT 9% 15%
6453 TATA Com. 4% 2%
5.2.4 Pretoria, South Africa, VP
Based on Figure 5.6, it is obvious the median percentage of traces that traverse a MPLS
tunnel are lower in 2015 compared to 2013 and 2014. However, similar to Section 5.2.2,
the bottom quartile in 2014 indicates that the trend towards the lower percentage may have
started sometime within 2014. Therefore, we look to our database in an attempt to pinpoint
a particular date range when the downward shift in traces that traverse a MPLS tunnel
occurred for Pretoria, South Africa (pry-za).
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Figure 5.6. Pretoria, South Africa
Table 5.15. Pretoria VP traceroutes traversing a MPLS tunnel percentages
by year








Table 5.16. Pretoria, South Africa, VP notable ASN changes
Change in percent of MPLS tunnels by notable AS
ASN AS Name 2014 Percentage 2015 Percentage
3356 LEVEL3 56% <1%
7018 AT&T 11% 18%
2914 NTT 10% 20%
6461 Zayo 3% 9%
174 Cogent Comm. 2% 11%
traceanalysis=> select x.monitor, x.cycle_START, X.PERC from (select distinct on
(monitor, cycle_start) monitor, cycle_start, (mpls_cnt/trace_cnt::float)
as perc from files where cycle_start >= ’20140801’ and cycle_start < ’20141001’
and trace_cnt !=0 and monitor = ’pry-za’)x order by x.cycle_start asc;
monitor | cycle_start | perc
---------+---------------------+-------------------
pry-za | 2014-08-01 16:07:26 | 0.581443063946199
pry-za | 2014-08-03 05:10:10 | 0.594077115900588
pry-za | 2014-08-04 18:18:06 | 0.60913290915197
pry-za | 2014-08-06 19:40:48 | 0.583545418950666
pry-za | 2014-08-08 10:39:16 | 0.584125526215078
pry-za | 2014-08-09 23:46:59 | 0.584190582304175
pry-za | 2014-08-11 12:32:49 | 0.584744276350406
pry-za | 2014-08-13 00:33:15 | 0.560803569320838
pry-za | 2014-08-14 15:03:05 | 0.551814683401296
pry-za | 2014-08-16 05:59:16 | 0.563573282747604
pry-za | 2014-09-11 19:47:07 | 0.330208079528288
pry-za | 2014-09-13 11:12:13 | 0.367767934658195
pry-za | 2014-09-15 01:20:51 | 0.341819312827572
pry-za | 2014-09-16 15:37:53 | 0.329869996929061
pry-za | 2014-09-17 18:53:42 | 0.32658971409793
pry-za | 2014-09-19 07:50:19 | 0.332321152856408
pry-za | 2014-09-20 19:31:58 | 0.335214773648257
pry-za | 2014-09-22 07:14:58 | 0.332586260258914
pry-za | 2014-09-23 19:26:54 | 0.325013320021312
pry-za | 2014-09-25 06:59:27 | 0.324354741896759
pry-za | 2014-09-26 18:20:17 | 0.345762575128071
pry-za | 2014-09-28 05:50:16 | 0.33413245430027
pry-za | 2014-09-29 17:58:03 | 0.329333871076158
(23 rows)
Figure 5.7. Downward shift by percentage of MPLS by cycle for the pry-za
VP
Figure 5.7 displays an approximate date and time for the start of the downward trend. From
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2014-08-01 through 2014-08-16 we can observe the normal, expected, percentage from
all previous data in our dataset for the pry-za VP. However, from 2014-09-11 onwards
we observe a decrease in percentage that remains constant from that point onwards in our
dataset. Based on our previous observations in Table 5.16, we believe that 2014-09-11 is
the approximate inflection point for when ASN 3356 (LEVEL3) made significant changes
to their infrastructure, a ecting MPLS routers within. This trend for ASN 3356 appears
common, even among VP that are experiencing an increase in the percentage of traceroutes
traversing a MPLS tunnel.
5.2.5 Singapore VP
Figure 5.8 and Table 5.17 demonstrate a steady increase in percentage of traceroutes that
traverse a MPLS tunnel over each year. As a comparison, Figure 5.5 shows a dramatic
increase from a starting point of 45% to 93%, an almost 50% total increase over 5 years.
The Singapore VP starts at 61%, displaying a more modest 5 year total increase of 25%.
As with the other VPs, inspecting the di erent ASN contributions towards the total MPLS
tunnels provides insight into these changes.
Figure 5.8. Singapore
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Table 5.17. Singapore VP traceroutes traversing a MPLS tunnel percentages
by year







Table 5.18. Singapore VP notable ASN changes
Change in percent of MPLS tunnels by notable AS






2914 NTT 42% 48% 57%
3356 LEVEL3 21% 11% 9%
7018 AT&T 9% 9% 7%
6453 TATA 7% 6% 4%
6461 Zayo 3% 1% 2%
Similar to the other VPs, we can observe two trends across the various ASNs in Table 5.18.
The first trend is that LEVEL3 declines in the percentage of MPLS tunnels seen by the
Singapore VP, but not in as extreme of a way as other studied VPs. The second trend is
that NTT increases in its share of the percentage over the 5 years. Sao Paulo, Pretoria, New
Orleans, and Dublin ASN comparison tables all demonstrate the same trend of an increase
in NTT MPLS tunnels. However NTT is not the top contributor of MPLS tunnels for these
VP, like it is in Singapore. Therefore, NTT appears to be the ASN mainly responsible for
the 25% increase in MPLS tunnels over the past 5 years for the Singapore VP.
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5.2.6 Hamilton, New Zealand, VP
Figure 5.9 demonstrates an upward trend in the percentage of traceroutes that traverse a
MPLS tunnel over each year, with an odd spike and many outliers near 50% in 2014. This
is a slightly di erent trend from what was observed in figures 5.8, where the increase was
consistent and continuous through the 5 years. Table 5.20 indicates that the total increase
over 5 years, excluding the anomalous spike in 2014, is 10%. Inspecting which ASNs are
most responsible for the MPLS tunnels is required to attempt an explanation.
Figure 5.9. Hamilton, New Zealand
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Table 5.19. Hamilton, New Zealand, VP traceroutes traversing a MPLS
tunnel percentages by year







Table 5.20. Hamilton, New Zealand, VP notable ASN changes
Change in percent of MPLS tunnels by notable AS






4826 Vocus 63% 54% <1%
3356 LEVEL3 10% 12% <1%
7018 AT&T 6% 6% 9%
2914 NTT 1% 1% 20%
7575 AARNet <1% <1% 17%
6461 Zayo <1% <1% 30%
Table 5.20 demonstrates large changes between 2013 and 2015 for individual ASN. Hamil-
ton, New Zealand’s VP continues the trend of a sudden decrease in percentage of MPLS
tunnels traversed for LEVEL3 in 2015. Hamilton also has a regional ASN, Vocus, who
accounts for more than half of the MPLS seen in 2013 and 2014, but then suddenly drops to
below 1% in 2015. Meanwhile, NTT makes a large increase in 2015. With the exception of
Vocus, these trends seem consistent with what has been observed from other VPs, however
the Hamilton VP seems to have especially exaggerated changes on a per ASN basis.
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5.3 Observed MPLS Change from LEVEL3
Of all the ASNs observed during the analysis by VPs, LEVEL3 demonstrated the most
consistent and dramatic change. LEVEL3 across all studied VPs had their percentage of
MPLS tunnels drop near 2015. The cause of this one specific ASN changing within the data
could perhaps be explained by LEVEL3 implementing changes within their infrastructure.
LEVEL3 could be moving away from MPLS as a networking technology. LEVEL3 also
could be no longer advertising the MPLS routers and instead using them in an opaque
or invisible mode. The motivation for doing so could be due to security or competitive
advantage reasons.
We performed analysis of LEVEL3 before and after the observed LEVEL3 (ASN 3356)
event in an attempt to determine other alternative explanations for why there was a sudden
drop in MPLS. For example, an explanation could be that LEVEL3 is no longer a major
transit network or that there was a significant routing change. Based on the shifts observed
in Figures 5.4 and 5.7, we picked a cycle before the event, 2014-08-01, and a cycle after the
event had manifested, 2014-10-30. We looked for the total amount of traceroutes in each
cycle, the total amount of traceroutes with a hop that traversed ASN 3356, and the count
for those hops belonging to ASN 3356 that contained MPLS. Table 5.21 summarizes our
findings that the percentage of traceroutes through ASN 3356 did not significantly change,
while the percentage of traceroutes with hops that have IP addresses belonging to ASN 3356
with MPLS. This signifies that it is more likely some change in LEVEL3’s infrastructure.
Table 5.21. LEVEL3 demonstrated no noticeable change in frequency of








2014-08-01 10,254,907 2,111,141 1,593,134 21% 75%
2014-10-30 10,588,199 2,041,599 981 19% .04%
We reached out to LEVEL3 on 2018-2-27 for possible validation of our observations and
any other information that they would be willing to share. We have not received a response
at the time of this writing.
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5.4 MPLS Correlation with Artifacts
A question worth attempting to answer is if there is any correlation between MPLS and
these suspicious traceroutes. To attempt to answer this question, we looked in our artifact
database for the ASN that appeared most frequently near the top for percentage of traceroutes
that traversed a MPLS tunnel. Table 5.22 shows that the percentage of the total suspicious
traceroutes appears to be low for some of the most common ASN in Section 5.1.
Table 5.22. All VP notable MPLS ASN Suspicious traceroute counts
Suspicious Count and hop Percentage by Notable MPLS ASN
ASN AS Name Suspicious Count Percentage
All - 20,390,676 100%
3356 LEVEL3 309,193 1.5%
2914 NTT 60,530 .3%
16735 ALGAR 44,745 .2%
7018 AT&T 18,666 .1%
Another way to look at this data is to query the suspicious traceroutes and identify what
percentage indicated the presence of MPLS. 253,153 of the 901,478 total suspicious tracer-
outes identified in our database contained at least one hop with ICMP extension, indicating
the presence of a MPLS tunnel. This indicates that about 28% of our suspicious tracer-
outes contained detectable MPLS. Of the 20,390,676 hops and responses in the suspicious
traceroute table, only 4,906,474 contained MPLS. This is an even lower percentage of 24%.




Conclusion and Future Work
If nothing else, this work demonstrates that MPLS is still prevalent in today’s Internet,
although its utilization or advertisement of utilization can vary on an AS over time. LEVEL3
has clearly changed how their internal networks utilize MPLS, which drastically changed
in approximately 2015. One theory to explain this change could be that LEVEL3 and
other large ASs are moving away from the use of MPLS towards a new, better networking
technology. These backend networking technology could also be a shift towards an entire
IPv6 infrastructure within the AS. Another theory could be that the ASs that show a decrease
in the percentage of traceroutes that traverse a MPLS tunnel are simply not advertising the
MPLS enabled routers anymore. This could be explained by the security concerns that a
motivated adversary may create a denial of service on an ingress MPLS router, causing
degradation of the large AS’s network. These large ASs can use internal tools designed
specifically for diagnostics of MPLS routers, negating the need for the network operator
to use RFC 4950 to advertise the MPLS router. Of course, this would harm researchers
abilities to study MPLS prevalence on the Internet, but to a network operator this would be
a lower priority.
We also identified a number of traceroute artifacts using our original classifications and
algorithms. We were able to discover some well known traceroute gags within our 5
years of CAIDA traceroute data, such as the “Star Wars Traceroute” and “Bad.Horse”. We
also were able to discover some previously unknown anomalous traceroutes, such as our
Comstar and Befree examples. When inspecting suspicious traceroutes that demonstrated
both sequential IPIDs and many hop IP addresses in the same /24, we discovered that some
of these traceroutes also exhibited the characteristic of having multiple responses to single
probe. Finally, although many of the suspicious traceroutes that we studied contained MPLS
within them, we can not claim that MPLS utilization is correlated with the artifacts that
we observe. As one datapoint, LEVEL3, the largest contributor to MPLS tunnels, only
accounted for 3% of suspicious traceroutes while the largest contributor at 14%, PROXAD,
did not appear as a top contributor of MPLS. Also, only 28% of our suspicious traceroutes
traversed an MPLS tunnel, which is under the average percentage of MPLS tunnels traversed
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for all traceroutes.
A motivation for studying these anomalous traceroutes was their potential impact on topol-
ogy graphs. Clearly, some of the anomalous traceroutes discovered are not real topologies,
specifically the traceroute gags. Some of the other examples, such as the Befree instance,
are likely some kind of misconfiguration. These could potentially lead to small false infer-
ences, leading to a non-perfect network topology. However, the anomalous traceroutes do
not make up a significant fraction of the entire traceroute dataset. On a macroscopic level,
it does not appear that researchers would need to be significantly concerned about these
artifacts in relation to the accuracy of topology graphs.
6.1 Primary Contributions and Takeaways
• Discovered from 2013-2017, the average detected MPLS tunnels traversed over all
VPs hovers between 33% and 46%, while varying widely between VPs.
• Identified Level 3 as a large AS who stopped utilizing or advertising MPLS in
September of 2014 across multiple VPs.
• MPLS as a networking technology in large ISPs is still being used, but there are
alternatives that may explain the reduction in overall percentages. Additionally, there
may be security concerns incentivizing large ISPs to disregard use of RFC 4950 [9]
and instead not advertise that they are even using the technology.
• Demonstrated that MPLS does not appear to be the likely cause of the majority of
these anomalous traceroutes.
• PROXAD (“Free” ISP) responsible for the most suspicious traceroute results.
• Discovered a “wild”, previously undiscovered, Star Wars traceroute gag within our
suspicious traceroute.
• Identified traceroutes with many responses to a single traceroute probe, another
anomalous traceroute characteristic for researchers to look for in the future.
6.2 Future Work
We use this section to describe research that we have left for the future due to lack of time.
Future researchers should consider working on the following areas to expand upon work
done in this thesis.
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6.2.1 MPLS Research
New methods for discovering MPLS tunnels have been published since starting this research,
which should certainly be used to study the utilization of MPLS as a technology [51]. The
importance of continuing to study MPLSs prevalence in todays internet is evident and
summarized nicely by this quote,
For years, Internet topology research has been conducted through active measurement.
For instance, Caida builds router level topologies on top of IP level traces obtained
with traceroute. The resulting graphs contain a significant amount of nodes with a very
large degree, often exceeding the actual number of interfaces of a router. Although this
property may result from inaccurate alias resolution, we believe that opaque MPLS
clouds made of invisible tunnels are the main cause. Using Layer-2 technologies
such as MPLS, routers can be configured to hide internal IP hops from traceroute.
Consequently, an entry point of an MPLS network appears as the neighbor of all
exit points and the whole Layer-3 network turns into a dense mesh of high degree
nodes. [51]
These researchers have developed methods to assist in finding these opaque MPLS tunnels.
These new methods should be used to study LEVEL3 and other ASNs to discover if the
methods we used for detecting MPLS missed parts of their MPLS infrastructure. One
explanation for our observations is that the ASN changed how they configure their MPLS
routers to respond to traceroute probes.
Future researchers should also reach out to the large ASN network operators for possible
insights into the change in MPLS. We reached out to LEVEL3 ourselves, but have not
heard back as of this writing. Contacting other ASNs, such as NTT who demonstrated an
increase in percentage of MPLS, could also be useful in providing insight into what caused
these changes.
Finally, we were only able to look at 5 vantage points in-depth regarding the change in
their observed MPLS tunnels. In the Appendix are boxplots of other VPs that demonstrate
varied changes in the percentage of MPLS over the 5 years. Future researchers may want
to consider these VPs if searching for other regional ASN that may have made changes to
their infrastructure regarding MPLS.
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6.2.2 Suspicious Traceroutes
In Section 4, we analyze various suspicious traceroutes that we detected. These anomalous
traceroutes were detected by looking for two main characteristics. Figure 4.11 demonstrates
a third characteristic, multiple responses to a single probe, that we believe future researchers
should look for when studying suspicious traceroutes in large-scale traceroute data. The
majority of our 73 traceroutes that demonstrated the original characteristics we were looking
for involving multiple hops in the same /24 and sequential IPIDs also demonstrated the new
characteristic. It would be worth going through our 5 years of CAIDA traceroute data to
look for traceroutes that only demonstrate the multiple responses to a single probe, or to
look through future years worth of data.
In addition, the historical DNS dataset is extremely useful for searching for well-known
traceroute gags or patterns. Future researchers interested in specific traceroute gags should
compile DNS strings to search for within this dataset. This is particularly useful for gags
that are no longer active or for identifying the approximate time that a gag was active. The
DNS dataset is especially useful for traceroute gags that manifest to probes to multiple IP
addresses within a /24 space, rather than being responsive to only to a single IP address.
6.2.3 Future Rapid Analysis
CAIDA is continuously collecting IPv4 traceroute data that can be analyzed by future
researchers. We believe that the techniques and methods used in this research could be
streamlined to perhaps identify both trends in MPLS and suspicious traceroutes, perhaps
on a monthly basis. By automating this analysis, the quick turn around could allow a
researcher to study these trends and artifacts in the present time. This can be especially
important for suspicious traceroutes, as they often cease to exist in a short amount of time.
For example, the Star Wars Traceroute ceased to exist after approximately 14 months. Being
able to identify these anomalous traceroutes quickly could be very useful. Observing MPLS
trends quickly can also be useful, as contacting network operators of large ISP may be more
successful if they more recently made a change. In addition, e ects on the topology may
be more easy to observe for researchers studying changes in real time.
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6.2.4 IPv6
IPv4 is still widely used on todays Internet and will likely remain popular for years to come.
However, in 2012 IPv6 was launched and since has been adopted steadily throughout the
Internet, especially by large ISP who many be concerned about IPv4 address exhaustion.
There are issues to take into account regarding the di erences between studying IPv4 and
IPv6. One issue is IPv4 address space is 232 while IPv6 is 2128. This makes it much more
resource intensive and time consuming to study the entirety of an unfiltered IPv6 dataset.
CAIDA has an IPv6 routed topology infrastructure, as part of their Ark platform, that probes
announced IPv6 prefixes that are /48 or shorter [52]. Therefore this dataset is much more
manageable to study than the entirety of the IPv6 space.
There are techniques used in this thesis involving IPv4 that could work in research involving
IPv6. Searching for multiple hops or responses in the same /48 or /64 within a single
traceroute would be viable and could lead to the discovery of IPv6 artifacts similar to the
ones we discovered in IPv4. However, identifying anomalous traceroutes with sequential
IPIDs is not possible because IPIDs do not exist in IPv6.
6.2.5 Database Techniques for Traceroute Data
Although we made good use of a structured database for our 5 years of CAIDA traceroute
data, in some cases we approached the limits of what it could handle. More complex
queries across the entire dataset could take anywhere from hours to days to complete across
billions of rows. If a researcher required a database containing all of the years worth of
traceroute data, unfiltered, this approach would not su ce. Therefore, a database utilizing a
technology such as RocksDB, a high performance key-value store, may be a better solution.
CAIDA has such a system for querying traceroute data, given the title Henya. [53] While
Henya is currently functional, at the time of this writing it does not have all VPs traceroute
data available, with some VPs limited to roughly a year of data. However, Henya is still
under development and is expected to eventually have all VPs traceroute data added to it for
querying. We strongly recommend future researchers consider using Henya when studying
historical traceroute data.
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APPENDIX: Vantage Point Boxplots
The following figures represent VPs that we did not have time to examine in depth.
Figure A.1. Ames, Iowa, United States
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Figure A.2. Barcelona, Spain
Figure A.3. Stockholm, Sweden
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Figure A.4. Cheongju, South Korea
Figure A.5. Dakar, Senegal
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Figure A.6. Geneva, Switzerland
Figure A.7. Helsinki, Finland
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Figure A.8. Leipzig, Germany
Figure A.9. Monterey, California, United States
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Figure A.10. Narita, Japan
Figure A.11. Oakland, California, United States
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Figure A.12. San Diego, California, United States
Figure A.13. Hong Kong
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Figure A.14. Sydney, Australia
Figure A.15. Toronto, Canada
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